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OF SHRINES, MEMORIALS AND MUSEUMS:
USING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT'S VICTIM REPARATION AND
ASSISTANCE REGIME TO PROMOTE
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Friddric Migret*
This article reviews and critically assesses the Rome Statute's com-
plex victim reparation and assistance regime. The regime is a dual one,
characterized by its reliance both on reparations ordered by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and assistance provided by the Trust Fund for Vic-
tims. Both approaches raise a series of quantitative, qualitative, scope and
contextual problems which are very imperfectly answered at present. In
particular, there is a risk that the broader needs of transitional justice will
be omitted as falling neither under "reparations" or "assistance." Rather
than address the issue of the best reparations/assistance regime in the ab-
stract, this article explores the real-world potential of a particular form of
transitional practice, namely the construction of shrines, memorials and
museums to commemorate victims of mass crimes. I conclude that there are
complex ties between the construction of such "monuments" and memory,
transitional justice, and victim expectations. Moreover, there is a discreet
but constant practice of fitting the building of such commemorative monu-
ments both within judicial theories, such as responsibility and reparation,
and less formal processes of reckoning with the past, such as truth commis-
sions. The experience of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in or-
dering monuments as reparations is highlighted as evidence of an
innovative international best practice. This article seeks to assess how this
experience could be transferred to the ICC/TFV context. I conclude that,
although additional complexities would arise, there is no reason why the
Rome Statute's victim reparation and assistance regime could not order or
encourage the building of so-called "sites of conscience." Such action
would better manage victim expectations, make good use of scarce re-
sources, address collective victim needs, make sense symbolically of the
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harm caused, provide a more complex narrative of events than interna-
tional criminal verdicts, highlight multiple causes and responsibilities, and
help distinguish the ICC and TFV's efforts from competing initiatives. It
would, in other words, help better integrate international criminal justice
with transitional justice goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
one of its great ambitions has been to provide a meaningful avenue of re-
dress for victims. Now approaching the end of its first decade of existence,
the ICC's reparations regime remains a bit of a mystery,' which is not en-
tirely a surprise given the absence and, at this stage, seeming remoteness of
any verdict. The Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure for the ICC are
stronger guides for the procedural regime for reparations 2 than they are for
the actual substance of the reparations. The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV),
a separate institution created by the Rome Statute that is to complement the
Court's actions vis-i-vis victims, has been careful not to make too many
declarations as to what its policy might be, and is only beginning to be
active. To an extent, the ICC's policy vis-A-vis victims has yet to be de-
fined, and has the potential to be a dense field of developments and chal-
lenges in years ahead.
There is no doubt that the stakes are considerable. The magnitude
of suffering provoked by mass atrocities has grave implications for interna-
tional peace and security, as well as transition from tragic events to a pro-
cess of healing. Indeed, it is on a scale that has rarely been witnessed
before. Taking such suffering into account will condition the ability of soci-
I Significant literature on the topic remains scant. See generally Carla Ferstman,
The Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court: Practical Considera-
tions, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 667 (2002); Peter G. Fischer, The Victims' Trust Fund
of the International Criminal Court - Formation of a Functional Reparations
Scheme, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 187 (2003); DINAH L. SHELTON & THORDIS IN-
GADOTTER, CTR. ON INT'L COOPERATION, N.Y. UNIv., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT REPARATIONS TO VICTIMS OF CRIMES (ARTICLE 75 OF THE ROME
STATUTE) AND THE TRUST FUND (ARTICLE 79): RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (1999), available at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/PICT-articles/REPARATIONS.pdf; Jo-anne Wemmers, INT'L
CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, UNIV. OF MONTREAL, REPARATION AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MEETING THE NEEDS OF VICTIMS (2006)
[hereinafter WEMMERS REPORT], available at http://www.cicc.umontreal.cal
recherche/victimologie/reparation-icc.pdf; .
2 See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, New York, Sept. 3-10, 2002, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules
94, 95, 106, ICC-ASP/1/3, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/RulesofProc_
andEvid_070704-EN.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]; Int'l Criminal Court [ICC],
Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/ (follow "The Regulations of
the Court" hyperlink; then follow "English" hyperlink) [hereinafter ICC
Regulations].
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eties to pull through particularly traumatic episodes with a sense of justice.
Moreover, to the extent that victims increasingly invest hopes in the Court's
reparations regime, the Court's success will be tied to its ability to deliver
on this front. Further complicating the debate, the growing role of interna-
tional human rights law ensures that this issue is no longer simply one of
policy, but one increasingly tainted with obligation. For better or for worse,
the hopes of victims are now by necessity turned towards the reparations
regime governed by the ICC and TFV, at the expense of a number of alter-
native mechanisms.
However, there already seems to be a danger of gaps between what
the Court and the Fund promise implicitly and what they can deliver. There
further remain some significant conceptual ambiguities about each of their
roles, and their role vis-a-vis each other. In this article, I will refer to the
"Rome regime" or "Rome institutions" as an acknowledgment of the fact
that it is sometimes useful to treat these as part of a broad scheme. How-
ever, the reality is that the system is also a profoundly dual, hybrid, even
schizophrenic one. The main tension running through the whole "Rome re-
gime" is one between Court-ordered reparations, on the one hand, and TFV-
managed assistance on the other. Reparations are perhaps what the ICC was
originally and primarily supposed to provide to victims. In the ICC context,
they are linked to the trial process and a finding of guilt, and are ordered
against the convicted person to compensate his or her victims on the basis
of responsibility for harm caused. They are typically backward looking, and
classically seek to put the victimized individual or group in the position
they were before the crime occurred. The logic of TFV assistance is quite
different. It is not judicial and follows a pattern more akin to that of certain
domestic victim compensation schemes, which lies somewhere between hu-
manitarian and welfare logics. For example, most of the assistance the Fund
can provide is not tied to any particular finding of guilt, and is funded by
voluntary contributions by third parties.
This creates a complex conundrum in terms of what the Rome insti-
tutions are supposed to do vis-a-vis victims. If, on the one hand, one con-
ceives of the ICC as the primary institution for victims to seek recourse, and
as primarily an institution of international criminal justice (i.e., one that
tries people first and foremost, whatever else may ensue), then what is done
for victims will depend closely on what happens in the courtroom, and repa-
rations will be the key concern for victims. If, on the other hand, one con-
siders that the TFV will have the leading role when it comes to victims,
then rehabilitation and assistance are what victims can primarily expect
from the Rome institutions. The TFV has the potential to shift the emphasis
away from reparations altogether, especially since it will start working with
victims much earlier than the Court and will be much more accessible. Nev-
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ertheless, there is much tension between the two Rome institutions, and it is
already clear that the ICC's approach to victim efforts, which is oriented
more towards legal and human rights, will be in conflict with the TFV's
more humanitarian ambitions.
This article will not be predominantly concerned with this tension
between the ICC reparations logic and the TFV's assistance focus as such,
although it will be interested in some of the obstacles and potentialities that
such tension creates. Rather, I suggest that both institutions will miss their
true potential if they fail to take into account the particular needs of transi-
tional justice.3 Although international criminal justice and transitional jus-
tice are sometimes equated, and are arguably complementary, they are, of
course, quite different paradigms of what is the most important strategy to
pursue in the aftermath of atrocities. International criminal justice is the
effort to prosecute individuals internationally for the commission of crimes
under international law. It has given rise to such concepts and institutions as
universal jurisdiction and international criminal tribunals. In this article,
transitional justice is conceived, minimally, as the particular form of justice
required by a society's move from a state where international crimes are
committed to one where they are no longer. Its emphasis is on the need to
reestablish a culture of legal normality after episodes in which graves
crimes have been committed.
Tensions between international criminal justice and transitional jus-
tice have been demonstrated, for over a decade now, as being potentially
very problematic, particularly for the fate of international criminal tribu-
nals. 4 In the context of the ICC/TFV regime, there is nothing evident about
adopting a more "transitional" role. Transitional justice has increasingly fo-
cused on the needs of victims, whose participation in healing processes and
reintegration into society is generally considered crucial if societies are to
transcend traumatic episodes. At the same time, transitional justice offers a
slightly different take on victim needs than either the ICC's legal emphasis
on reparations or the TFV's welfarist focus on assistance.
This is evidenced, for example, by the quite strong reaction of some
NGOs to the TFV's first draft "Strategic Plan"5 which significantly refer-
enced the idea of "transitional justice,"6 and noted that "promoting commu-
3 See generally RUTi G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing what
is meant by "transitional justice").
4 See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999).
5 Trust Fund for Victims [TFV], TFV Global Strategic Plan 2008-2011, version
1, (2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Global Strategic Plan].
6 Id. at 21, 23, 81.
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nity reconciliation"'7 was within its mandate. The NGOs argued that
reconciliation, a hallmark of transitional justice, is "beyond the Fund's
mandate" and that "[i]nstead, the Fund's activities should aim at providing
redress for victims, restoring victims' dignity and facilitating their reinte-
gration into society." 9 Whether these goals are incompatible is, of course,
open to question. Transitional justice is typically very attentive to how vic-
tims' needs are inseparable from an aspiration to justice, as well as how
such needs are ultimately dependent on the manner in which the suffering
of the victims is taken into account as part of larger processes of reckoning.
However, my point here is that there already seems to be a tension between
the Court's reparatory focus, the TFV's assistance orientation, and the
larger needs of societies in transition. Nevertheless, somewhere on the fault
lines of the ICC and the TFV regimes, this tension may precisely open a
space for efforts more resolutely geared towards transitional justice by the
"Rome institutions."
As a prime example of what the ICC and the TFV could do, I sug-
gest a slightly unorthodox mix of international criminal and transitional jus-
tice, reparations and assistance, the material and the symbolic. I am
particularly interested in a real-world practice that has had a known and
significant impact on victims and transitional justice processes, and that I
consider emblematic, rather than exclusive, of what the Rome institutions
could encourage, namely, the building of what are often referred to as "sites
of conscience."10 Sites of conscience are, essentially, sites built with a spe-
cific commemorative purpose that aim to encourage reconciliation and the
non-repetition of certain types of historical events. They can include monu-
ments such as shrines, memorials and museums. They have, I argue, a key
role to play in bridging legal concepts of victim reparation, humanitarian
ideas of victim assistance and the larger needs of transitional societies.
On the face of it, such a role for the Rome institutions can seem
quite remote from what the ICC reparations/assistance regime should be
geared towards. Indeed, the possibility is rarely mentioned, except in pass-
7 Id. at 11, 23, 24, 58, 59, 80, 81.
8 Coalition for the Int'l Criminal Court, Comments on the Trust Fund for Victims'
Global Strategic Plan for 2009-2011, 2, (March 2009) [hereinafter Comments on
Global Strategic Plan], available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/
CICCTFVTeamCommentsonTFVStrategic Plan_2009- 2 011 March_2009
.pdf.
9 Id. at 3.
10 See International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, http://www.sitesof
conscience.org/about-us/en/#section2 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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ing, in the literature on international criminal justice." Nevertheless, the
TFV itself has hinted at the possibility of "projects like memorials," whose
goal is to "acknowledge . . . atrocities."' 2 Shrines, monuments and muse-
ums, I argue, are powerful elements of transitional justice, and provide the
sort of endeavor to which the ICC/TFV regime could contribute usefully.
Part I of this article briefly retraces the origins of the ICC reparations and
TFV assistance regime. Part II suggests some of the limitations of the re-
gime. Part III introduces the history'and role of "sites of conscience" as
tools of transitional justice. In part IV, a number of cases are examined
where domestic or international bodies have already ordered the construc-
tion of such edifices as forms of reparation or rehabilitation. In part V, I
make the case that ordering or assisting in the construction of such "sites of
conscience" would be a powerful way of making sense of the ICC's repara-
tive function.
I. THE ROME STATUTE'S VICTIMS REGIME: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
For the purposes of a succinct presentation, the Rome Statute's vic-
tim-oriented efforts can be divided into three broad types of activities, al-
though they overlap to a degree.
A. Protection and Participation
The ad hoc tribunals already protected victims to the extent that
they appeared as witnesses.13 The ICC regime will obviously continue to do
this, by protecting victims who testify in a way that minimizes any adverse
impact to them.14 All organs of the Court are vested with the obligation to
provide appropriate measures to fully protect victims appearing during pro-
ceedings. A Victims and Witness Unit has been established to ensure the
safety of those participating and to protect the right of victims to express
" The only person to my knowledge to have suggested such a new function for
the Rome institutions is Linda Keller. See Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the
International Criminal Court: Victims' Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189,
210-12 (2006).
12 Global Strategic Plan, supra note 5, at 11.
13 See ICTY, Witnesses, http://www.icty.org/sid/158 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010);
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 22, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex
(1993) and S/25704/Add.l (1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
14 See ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rules 87, 88.
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their concerns freely.'5 Victim protection measures include security ar-
rangements, counseling and other forms of assistance deemed appropriate.16
However, protection, even though it may entail the provision of
psychological counseling or medical rehabilitation, is not to be confused
with assistance provided to victims more generally. In a sense, victims who
testify are being "groomed" by international criminal tribunals for the pur-
poses of testifying. One can see whatever assistance provided by the tribu-
nals as partly instrumental (as shown, for example, by the fact that most
assistance occurs immediately before and immediately after the testimony,
rather than over the long term). Protection is necessary not so much because
victims need it as because international criminal tribunals need witnesses.
Because the witnesses' participation will depend on their perception of how
they will be treated and, in particular, how they will be protected, it is cru-
cial for tribunals to be able to provide some guarantees.
The Rome Statute, however, goes much further in the direction of
victim protection by proclaiming, for the first time in the history of interna-
tional criminal justice, a principle of victim participation "[w]here the per-
sonal interests of the victims are affected .".. ."" At every stage, victims are
considered as participants, although not quite parties, whenever their inter-
ests are involved.' 8 Victims are provided support by the Court.19 Victims
have already successfully obtained the right to participate, including at the
investigation stage. 20 The Court also allows representation of organizations
and institutions.21 There is even an emerging sense that participation by
victims translates into at least a rough accountability of the Court to the
victims. For example, the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section is
15 See id. Rule 87(1).
16 See ICC, Victims and witness protection and support, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
Menus/ICC/Structure+of'Mhe+Court/Protection/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) [here-
inafter Victim and Witness Protection].
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 68(3), A/CONF.183/9
(July 1, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-
4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
'8 See id. art. 15(3), 19(3), 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c), 65(4) and 68(3).
'9 See id. art. 68.
20 First victims recognized by the International Criminal Court, INT'L FED'N FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS [FIDH], Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.fidh.org/article.
php3?id-article=2998.
21 ICC, Office of Public Counsel For Victims, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/Office+of+Public+
Counsel6r+Victims/Frequently+Asked+Questions.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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obliged to provide information where the Office of the Prosecutor has de-
cided not to open an investigation or commence with a prosecution. 22
B. Reparation
More important, perhaps, than just participation is, as was men-
tioned in the introduction, the emergence of a reparation regime for victims
of certain crimes where a person prosecuted by the Court has been found
guilty. 2 3 This is surely one of the most significant developments of the
Rome Statute. The sole means of reparation provided for by the ad hoc
tribunals' statutes involved restitution of stolen property,24 something which
the tribunals have never actually ordered. The individual victim of someone
convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was oth-
erwise to claim reparations through the national courts, once the accused
had been convicted and the judgment had been transmitted to the national
authorities. 25 This method of potential redress has had next to no impact in
practice.
The idea that victims of grave human rights violations are entitled
to reparations is one that has emerged strongly in the last two decades, 26
following a number of landmark reports on the issue.27 In 2005, it was sol-
22 ICC, Participation of Victims in Proceedings, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/Participation/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
23 See Rome Statute, supra note 187, art. 75; ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rules 94-
99.
24 S.C. Res. 955, art. 23(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
25 See id.; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prose-
cution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Extraordi-
nary Plen. Sess., at 104, IT/32/Rev. 42 (Nov. 4, 2008).
26 See generally, ILARIA BOrrIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
27 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Final
Report: The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2000/62 (Jan. 18, 2000) (prepared by Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni) [hereinafter Bas-
siouni Report]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Prot. Of Minorities, Revised Final Report:Question of
the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev. 1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (prepared by Mr. Joinet) [herein-
after Joinet Report]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Prot. Of Minorities, Final Report: Study Concerning
10 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 16
emnly proclaimed by the General Assembly in what is known as the "Vic-
tims Declaration." 2 8 The Victims Declaration has been dubbed, "for all
practical purposes, an international bill of rights of victims." 29 Already in
1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted, a strong consensus had emerged
that the ICC could not fail to provide some form of reparation. As can be
seen, the idea of reparation for grave crimes has both a strong legal and a
strong human rights bias; reparation is a right, as confirmed by a long string
of cases. 30
Reparations awarded by the ICC will be funded in large part
through fines, forfeitures and reparations ordered by the Court against con-
victed individuals. 31 Contrary to the regime of the ad hoc tribunals, there-
fore, it is contemplated that reparations will not be outsourced to domestic
courts, but will be very much centralized within the hands of the Court
itself, which can order them against individual defendants following a
guilty verdict.32 This regime is more complex and notable than that of the
tribunals because the Court, in its reparation-awarding function, can be sup-
plemented by the TFV. 3 3 In that particular (and probably secondary) role,
the TFV will act as the implementer of some of the reparations awards
ordered by the Court.34 This is presumably because it will be impractical for
the Court to take care of every detail of every reparations award, and the
TFV may be more suited in some cases to making collective awards. The
TFV will be required to take a variety of factors into account when "deter-
mining the nature and/or size of awards," such as "the nature of the crimes
the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Vio-
lations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (prepared by Mr. Theo van Boven) [hereinafter van Boven
Report].
28 See Victims Declaration, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21,
2006) [hereinafter Victims Declaration].
29 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 Hum. RTs.
L. REV. 203, 203 (2006). See generally Angel David Nieves & Ali Khangela
Hlongwane, Public History and "Memorial Architecture" in the "New" South Af-
rica: The Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum, Soweto, Johannesburg 8
Safundi 351 (2007) (discussing a particular impact of the Victims Declaration).
30 See infra § 4.
31 See Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC Res. ICC-ASP/4/Res.3,
para. 21, ICC, 4th plen. mtg., ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (Dec. 3 2005) [hereinafter TFV
Regulations].
32 Rome Statute, supra note 187, art. 75(2).
33 See id.
34 See ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 98.
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[and] the particular injuries to the victims . . . ."35 The Board of Directors of
the TFV is to devise an "implementation plan" which will be supervised by
the relevant Chamber, even though it clearly leaves a measure of autonomy
for the Board. 36
Notwithstanding the TFV's eventual bons offices, there is a sense
that the primary strength of the ICC reparation regime, which is its rooted-
ness in a strong concept of legal entitlement, might also be its main weak-
ness. The emphasis on reparation is very much the result of a strong legal
and human rights framework. However, the "right to reparations" is an idea
that was meant to apply primarily to states and give rise to reparations pro-
grams managed by states. Although international criminal tribunals argua-
bly deal with the equivalent of mass human rights violations, their focus is
clearly different than state reparations programs in that the international
tribunals are primarily designed to condemn individuals. In fact, the "re-
sponsible state" is the great absent in proceedings before the Court, except
for purposes of admissibility and cooperation. This absence is clearly not
compensated by the individual accused, who, if nothing else, will often sim-
ply not have anything like the deep pockets of the state.
C. Assistance
The Rome Statute, perhaps anticipating these limitations, also pro-
vides, through the TFV, a possibility of "assistance" to victims. In the past,
the ICTR registry has controversially engaged in some rehabilitation pro-
grams in Rwanda, including the financing of a survivors' village. 37 This
resembles what the TFV now proposes to do, except that the ICTR acted
precariously outside of any legal framework, whereas the TFV will rest on
firm foundations. Programs on behalf of victims which are funded by the
TFV may be awarded even before a verdict has been rendered, and to all
victims of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court rather than
victims of crimes committed by individuals who have been found guilty by
it.38 They are decided by the Board of Directors of the TFV whenever it
"considers it necessary to provide physical or psychological rehabilitation
or material support for the benefit of victims and their families," 3 9 rather
than when victims merit such assistance as a matter of right, as in the case
35 TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 55.
36 See id. para. 57.
37 See Afrol News, Peace Village for Rwandan Genocide Survivors in Construc-
tion (2000), http://www.afrol.com/html/News/rwa008_victim-initiative.htm.
38 See TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 1.
39 Id. para. 50 (emphasis added).
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of reparations. This autonomous power of the TFV is to be funded through
voluntary contributions from governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and non-governmental organizations.40
The inspiration for such emphasis on assistance seems to be taken
from various domestic victim compensation schemes, which mark a more
general move away from reparations. The problem with reparations is that
they remain excessively tied to the judicial process. Four ideas seem to be
particularly crucial in justifying the move away from sole reliance on the
reparative. First, reparations may take a long time to be awarded where
victims will often need any assistance they can get as early as possible.
Second, the accused will probably most of the time not have the means to
pay reparations to their victims, so that something must be done to help the
latter cope with the consequences of crime. Third, not all victims will be
"lucky" enough to have been victimized by an individual who happens to
be prosecuted and convicted by the Court, so that there is a need to do
something for the great mass of other victims. Finally, there may be a pub-
lic relations element to this, in which international criminal justice can ill
afford to seem aloof to the needs of victims, and where some stopgap mea-
sure will be required, long before reparations might be conceivable, to se-
cure the legitimacy of the ICC.
There is every reason to believe that the TFV may end up taking a
leading role in relation to victims, particularly due to some of the limita-
tions that are already evident in the Court's victim participation mechanism.
Indeed, some commentators have advocated that it do so as a result of it
being bound by fewer rules than the Court, and the Court's minimizing of
some of the advantages of victim participation in the trials, not to mention
the difficulties of obtaining reparations through domestic litigation.41 The
TFV "may be crucial in closing the gap between expectations of victims,
who typically have both an urgent psychological need for justice and an
urgent material need for support, and what the ICC itself can offer them." 42
At any rate, there is no doubt that two models - one based on reparations
and the other on assistance, one backward looking and guilt oriented, the
40 See id. para. 5.
41 See PABLO DE GREIFF & MARIEKE WIERDA, The Trust Fund for Victims of the
International Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints, in OUT OF
THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 225, 231 (K. de Feyter et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Between Pos-
sibilities and Constraints).
42 Marlies Glasius, What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and
Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court's First Investigations, 31
Hum. RTS. Q. 496, 517 (2009).
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other more fluid and general - are in tension. It is this problematic and, as
yet, insufficiently-theorized tension that creates various problems, but also,
as will be seen, potential for ICC and TFV involvement in transitional jus-
tice efforts.4 3
II. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE VICTIMS REGIME
Although the developments discussed above have been widely
hailed as progress,44 the ICC's reparations regime at this stage seems to
involve a number of ambiguities and difficulties. 4 5 Crucially, neither the
Court nor the TFV have made it very clear how they intend to coordinate
their efforts or honor their mandates separately. The Statute of the ICC, its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations adopted by the TFV
only very partially answer the questions they were supposed to address.
Reparation of this magnitude is something that has not been envisaged
before and is an effort that creates very significant challenges.
A. Quantitative Problems
There is, first, the problem of the scale of what the Rome institu-
tions should be doing for victims. The ICC is designed to prosecute the
worst crimes committed by the worst offenders. 46 In other words, it will, or
should, in most cases, be dealing with mass atrocities, either ordered by the
state or very significant non-state actors, often over significant amounts of
time. In practice, this means that victims will often be innumerable and the
harm suffered will be of the sort that is extremely difficult to compensate.
To make matters more complicated, domestic concepts, such as the idea of
restitutio ad integrum, which are often used to frame reparations issues do-
mestically, and which are already notoriously imperfect in that context,
seem almost wholly inappropriate in the international criminal environment.
The breadth of victims is even greater when it comes to those dealt with by
the TFV, because the victims are not only those accused of a particular act
43 See infra § V.
4 See generally Between Possibilities and Constraints, supra note 41.
45 See Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings
of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROss 409 (2008); Marc
Henzelin, Viejo Heiskanen & Gu6na61 Mettraux, Reparations to Victims Before the
International Criminal Court: Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes,
17 CRIM. L.F. 317 (2006).
46 See Rome Statute, supra note 187, art. 5.
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or crime, but all those who have suffered harm as "victims of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court. . ."47
Although it is not impossible that the TFV will amass sufficient
resources from voluntary contributions to address all demands for assis-
tance, and even contribute to reparations when the accused is insolvent, the
more plausible outcome is that it will have to make do with very limited
resources and find inventive ways to make the most of what resources it
has.4 8 Indeed, especially absent an obligation to contribute by states, and in
a context of many competing aid priorities, it is simply unlikely that the
ICC will ever be able to aid as much as might be desirable, let alone pro-
vide fully adequate reparations. This calls for very strategic planning and
creativity in order to make the most of restitutions and fines, as well as
voluntary contributions, while being alert to the fact that these resources
will most often be very finite.
There are also, inevitably, significant distributional risks involved
in the operation of such a potentially vast scheme. By distributional, I mean
the risk that certain victims or classes of victims will end up being unduly
privileged as a result of the ICC or the TFV's operation. The Court will in
all likelihood be the greatest culprit in this respect, as it will award repara-
tions only to individuals or groups that have been victimized by a person
convicted by it. This will inevitably create protests, especially from victims
who find it hard to obtain reparations domestically. Needless to say, there is
nothing particularly "meritorious" about having been the victim of someone
who happens to be convicted by the Court as opposed to someone who,
merely by result of not being one of the worst offenders or not being
caught, has not been.
The TFV is meant to alleviate the risk that obtaining reparations
will depend on the chance of having been victimized by an individual who
happens to have been convicted by the ICC, in that it can provide assistance
to victims who are not directly or indirectly affected by the crimes commit-
ted by the convicted person.49 There is, indeed, an argument in favor of
disconnecting the award of reparations from the judicial determination of
guilt precisely to provide such assistance. However, the TFV will also be
involved in its own huge selectivity, given the paucity of its resources and
the vastness of the needs in countries where atrocities have been committed
47 See TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 1.
48 In 2008, the TFV had _3,050,000 available to deliver assistance and repara-
tions. See ICC, Trust Fund for Victims, Current Projects, http://www.ice-cpi.intl
NR/exeres/ECIE83EC-A3B9-451F-8F6D-07DO360D48F5.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2010) [hereinafter Current Projects].
49 See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 75.
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and where victims will often number in the hundreds of thousands, if not
millions. Already, TFV-funded projects suggest a large degree of selectivity
which, at some point, is certain to create claims for assistance by victims
whose assistance projects have not been given priority. Of course, assis-
tance is not a right in the same way as reparations, but there will be a
legitimate expectation that it be distributed in ways commensurate with
needs. A further, albeit minor, distortion may be created by earmarked con-
tributions to the TFV, as can be made, under certain conditions, by non-
governmental and inter-governmental organizations. 50
Finally, the Court and the TFV will almost inevitably be faced with
a complex problem of management of expectations that is not simply a
public relations issue, but one that goes to the heart of what it means to
offer reparations and assistance. Although victims arguably participate for
reasons other than obtaining reparations, such as to influence prosecutorial
strategy, and with a view to ensuring the sort of conviction that will provide
them with redress, it is fair to expect that reparations will often feature
prominently among their motivations. The very mention of the word "repa-
rations" to deeply aggrieved victims in the context of international criminal
justice, compounded by various misunderstandings, may create expecta-
tions that the "international community" will provide reparations in most
cases. The presence of the TFV on the ground may both reinforce that per-
ception about reparations and create expectations about the substantial
availability of assistance. This has the potential to create tense situations,
especially if victims have been lured towards the Court as participants or, to
a lesser degree, by the TFV, only to find that their "investment," whether it
be emotional or temporal, is then poorly repaid.
B. Qualitative problems
A second broad range of problems created by the Rome Statute
regime relates to the precise nature of what the Court and TFV can provide
to victims. This is particularly striking when it comes to the list of available
reparations, which has a predominantly economic or material focus, and
seems to fall short of some of the reparations that have been considered
standard by human rights bodies. The ICC Statute anticipates that the Court
can order reparations in the form of "restitution, compensation and rehabili-
tation."5' Restitution would typically involve the restitution of property, al-
though it might be broader. Compensation is generally understood to refer
to economically assessable damage. The emphasis on expert assessment of
so See TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 21(a).
5' Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 75(2).
2010 15
16 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 16
"any damage, loss and injury" 52 suffered by victims does not particularly
point to the more symbolic sort of harm which satisfaction seeks to remedy.
"Award[s] for reparations" clearly seem to be financial in nature, at least
when they are to be "deposited with the Trust Fund;" 53 it is hard to imagine
a satisfaction measure being "deposited." The language of "disbursement"
and the idea that awards must be "received" by victims also point to a
largely financial logic at work.54
One can only speculate as to why this emphasis exists, but it may
have something to do with domestic models, the general trend of domestic
and transnational litigation towards monetary remedies and the tangible
character of financial awards. Missing from the Rome Statute's list are
more clearly symbolic forms of reparation, such as satisfaction and guaran-
tees of non-repetition, despite those being considered standard under human
rights law.55 The reasons why satisfaction, and non-repetition, for that mat-
ter, are not mentioned in the ICC legal regime, even though they are a
hallmark of other reparations regimes and are considered mandatory by in-
ternational law, 56 are complex and, to a degree, at least, impenetrable.57
52 ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 97(2).
5 Id. Rule 98.
54 See TFV Regulations, supra note 31, paras. 59, 65-58.
55 See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (1st ed. 1999); HENRY J. STEINER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (3d ed. 2008)
56 Indeed, some of the literature on the ICC seems to take satisfaction so much for
granted as part of the ordinary package of reparations that it asserts, as an article of
faith, that the ICC can order satisfaction measures. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, The
International Criminal Court: Fact Sheet 6 - Ensuring Justice for Victims, § 3, Al
Index IOR 40/07/00.
5 I have not been able to locate a single trace of this debate occurring in the
context of the Rome Conference or the adoption of the Rules or subsequent Regula-
tions. My impression is that we are dealing with a typical discreet and not totally
thought-out omission. Some of the more significant treatments of the ICC repara-
tions regime obviously skirt the issue. Pablo de Greiff and Marieke Wierda argue in
passing that satisfaction and non-repetition were not included "presumably because
they originate from the law of state responsibility." Marieke Wierda & Pablo de
Greiff, Reparations and the International Criminal Court: A Prospective Role for
the Trust Fund for Victims, Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], 3 n.4 (2000),
http://www.ictj.org/static/TJApproaches/Prosecutions/ReplCCTrustFund.eng.pdf.
However, such an argument does not really address the issue of why what is
deemed essential in one regime cannot be incorporated in another. It may be that
there is a problem with ordering individuals, as opposed to states, to provide satis-
faction, for example, by ordering a perpetrator to apologize to his or her victims.
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At any rate, although victims may be interested in some form of
monetary reparation, it is important not to limit their needs to that sole di-
mension. Monetary reparations have several limitations. They can, in some
cases, be somewhat ephemeral, their restorative content exhausted by the
fact of their being awarded. Typically, monetary reparations tend to be ori-
ented towards the past rather than the future. Of course, the money received
for the purposes of reparation will be used to improve the individual and
collective futures of victims, but without more it is unlikely to leave much
of a concrete legacy. Indeed, monetary reparations can, especially in certain
cultural, social and political contexts, have a trivializing effect on suffering,
at least if given in isolation. Victims of atrocities themselves are not neces-
sarily keen on financial reparations as much as they are on a fundamental
recognition of the harm done to them.18
Nevertheless, more symbolic-oriented reparations and assistance
are conceivable. For example, in the lead-up to the Rome Conference, a
broad view of reparations generally held sway. An amendment, submitted
in 1997 by France, referred to ". . . appropriate forms of reparation, such as
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation . . . ."59 The inclusion of the
words "such as" suggests that, at this relatively late stage, the list was not
meant as limitative.60 Indeed, there would be something a little paradoxical
Whilst it is possible to deprive an individual of something (most notoriously, for
example, of his or her freedom) as punishment, it remains much more difficult,
under liberal criteria, to justify ordering and possibly even forcing an individual to
positively do something. It seems here that freedom of thought, including the free-
dom to not repent, is something that modem humanism is attached to.
58 It is worth noting, however, that this is highly culturally and psychologically
sensitive. There is a risk of romanticizing the "victim other," particularly the victim
from the Global South, as not demanding money. There is a further risk of mone-
tary reparations being portrayed as typically "Northern," a manifestation, perhaps,
of a predominantly materialist culture. There is no doubt that, in some cases, vic-
tims will consider that some form of "blood money" is very much an entitlement,
especially in environments that do not neatly distinguish between criminal and civil
liability, and where the latter forms part of the "punishment" of perpetrators.
59 U.N. Gen. Assembly [GAORJ, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an
Int'l Criminal Court, Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January
1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (Feb. 4,
1998) (emphasis added).
60 An alternative proposal mentioned that "[t]he Trial Chamber shall, in accor-
dance with this Statute and the Rules of the Court, determine whether a monetary
award, or any other award by way of reparations, should be made against a con-
victed person" and suggested that "[a]n order for reparations may include . . . any
other order which the Court considers appropriate." Id. (emphasis added).
18 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 16
about the Court being in a position to order relatively more drastic material
reparations, but not symbolic ones. In fact, if one were to push the argument
a little bit, one could say that the Court will already be providing satisfac-
tion through its judgments6' and that, in a larger sense, international crimi-
nal justice should be in the business of providing whatever satisfaction it
can, especially when it can do so at relatively little cost. In its first draft
Victims Strategy document, the Court has shown that it is well aware of its
limitations and that its "broad mandate leaves room" for reparation that
could include "symbolic or other measures that could promote conciliation
within divided communities."62
"Rehabilitation" more explicitly straddles the economic/non-eco-
nomic divide, in that it refers to various forms of assistance (e.g., medical,
psychological, or social) that victims may receive. 63 Rehabilitation may, of
course, be ordered by the ICC qua reparations, or may be sponsored by the
TFV qua assistance. Incidentally, by the assistance stage, victims may be
thoroughly confused about what the basis is for receiving aid. Indeed, the
TFV is clearly more suited to transcend monetary biases, especially when
acting out of its own initiative; if ever there was any suggestion that the
ICC might make strictly monetary reparations, there is certainly no doubt
that the TFV will not be signing checks directly to victims. So far, many of
the actions of the TFV in terms of delivering assistance have been more in
the way of rehabilitation. Of the 42 current projects involving Northern
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have been submit-
ted by the TFV to the Chambers of the ICC for approval, all request the
61 It is particularly the Inter-American Court that has found that its judgments
provide, by themselves, a measure of satisfaction. Although such thinking is a bit
of a conceptual trick, it does capture an obvious, if not quite always intended as
such, finality of criminal judgments. Of course, in the ICC context, judgments are
not rendered for the victims as such, although there are references in the Preamble
to the Rome Statute to victims being among the more obvious objective benefi-
ciaries of international criminal justice. See Rome Statute, supra note 17, at 1.
However, it would cost the Court next to nothing in its judgments to highlight the
extent to which the judgments are rendered, at least in part, with that objective in
mind.
62 Draft ICC Strategy in Relation to Victims 29 (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Draft ICC Strategy].
63 This is the general definition of rehabilitation, and it is also the understanding
of several sources in the ICC context. See TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para.
50(a)(i) (discussing use of the TFV Trust Fund when "the Board of Directors con-
siders it necessary to provide physical or psychological rehabilitation or material
support for the benefit of victims and their families .... .").
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provision of psychological support, physical rehabilitation and material sup-
port for specific groups, such as ex-child soldiers or mutilated victims.M
Even rehabilitation, however, has its limits. The overarching em-
phasis in the context of the TFV's autonomous policy (and there is reason
to think the same would be true of the TFV's policy as implementer of
reparations orders) seems to be on a welfare/clinical approach to rehabilita-
tion, which emphasizes personal and community recovery but tends so far
to elude how that recovery might be linked to broader societal searches for
justice in post-conflict environments. For example, the TFV Regulations
speak of "rehabilitation or material support," 65 and projects have included
reconstruction of victimized villages or plastic surgery for those who suf-
fered disfigurements in the course of crimes. Sadly, there are not many
signs so far that the Court or TFV will engage in forms of reparations or
assistance directed at encouraging reconciliation, commemoration and truth
telling.
Another qualitative problem is linked to the degree to which vic-
tim-oriented efforts should be participatory in nature. In terms of repara-
tions, victim's movements have traditionally been at the forefront, with
substantial benefits to the victims, at times, against reluctant authorities. 66
There is a strong link between the idea of victim participation and victim
reparations, as is clear from the fact that victims have to establish their
qualifications on the basis of harm suffered, and that the standard form re-
quires them to evaluate that harm.6 7 The possibility of victim participation
before the Court ensures that their expectations will be known when it
comes to reparations. In terms of the TFV, the focus is also quite clearly
participatory, but in a fundamentally different way. The Board of Directors
of the TFV "may consult victims ... and, where natural persons are con-
cerned, their families, as well as their legal representatives." 68 The Board
has already shown a commendable willingness to communicate with rele-
vant populations and seek their opinions. Nevertheless, this is not a legal
participation in the sense that such participation is understood before the
6 Current Projects, supra note 48.
65 TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 50.
66 See HEIDY RoMBours, VICTIM ORGANISATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF REPARA-
TION: A CASE-STUDY ON RWANDA (2004).
67 See ICC, Standard Application Form to Participate in Proceedings Before
the International Criminal Court for Individual Victims and Persons Acting on their
Behalf, http://www.icc-cpi.int/MenusfICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/Partici
pation/Forms.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Victim Participation
Form].
68 TFV Regulations, supra note 311, para. 49.
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ICC. It is a much more informal form of participation that takes its cue
from, for example, models of participatory development. However, for both
the ICC and the TFV there is no guarantee that participation at, respec-
tively, reparations hearings and TFV calls for proposals will result in the
demands of victims being fully taken into account. The Court and the TFV
ultimately remain the ones to decide, and they may occasionally frustrate
victims' aspirations. Moreover, in both cases, there is always a risk that the
emergence of a significant international structure designed to cater to vic-
tims' needs might crowd out the victims' own efforts at making their voices
heard.
C. Scope Problems
Scope of victim policy issues arise both ratione personae and ra-
tione temporis. There is, first, a tension between individual and collective
beneficiaries. This tension is particularly apparent when it comes to Court-
ordered reparations, which can, in theory, be both individual and collective.
Reparations are presented, for example, as being solicited by "a victim,"
rather than groups of victims, or even a single group of all victims.69 The
fact that victims are asked to individually fill out detailed forms devised by
the Registrar outlining their individual prejudice 70 may also create expecta-
tions that reparations will be individual.71 At this stage, it is unclear what
the Court will decide, but there would be a very real danger of excessive
individualization of reparations in a context where, for all the accumulation
of individual suffering, the harm inflicted often targeted groups or the civil-
ian population rather than specific individuals.
Moreover, individual reparations might reach unprecedented
heights, thus magnifying the problem of inadequacy of available funds. As
has already been remarked by others, there is a risk that excessively individ-
ualized reparations, by breaking the suffering of victims into disaggregated
segments, will lose sight of the collective and societal dimension of exper-
iencing mass atrocities, a suffering that can never be entirely appropriated
by each victim independently, regardless of how much he or she has suf-
fered. 72 There is, finally, a risk that individual reparations will create further
69 ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 94(1).
70 Id. Rule 89; See ICC Regulations, supra note 2, Regulation 86. The "standard
forms shall, to the extent possible, be made available to .. . groups of victims," but
only a single victim is to fill out the form. Id. Regulation 86(1).
71 See Victim Participation Form, supra note 67. There is definitely a contrast
between the idea that collective reparations may be awarded and the fact that one
has to apply for reparations individually.
72 See Between Possibilities and Constraints, supra note 41, at 233.
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distortions between victims, such as, for example, those that chose to par-
ticipate in proceedings and those that did not. Whilst individual reparations
may be an appropriate remedy in the context of international human rights
tribunals where the victims are few and readily identifiable, they will typi-
cally not be well suited to the sort of mass crimes the ICC will be dealing
with. 73
The Statute, however, also makes it clear that collective reparations
are a possibility. According to Rule 98(3), "[t]he Court may order that an
award for reparations against a convicted person be made through the Trust
Fund where the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities
of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate."74 The Court has,
in strategic documents, made it clear that it conceives of reparation as in-
cluding "collective forms of reparation."7 5 Indeed, in terms of participation
in proceedings, there are a number of other ways in which victims are en-
couraged to aggregate which suggest room for collective reparations. 76 The
TFV's role in that respect represents an attempt to partly emancipate the
reparations regime from the particulars of each individual victim. In cases
where the Court does not identify the beneficiaries of an award, it will be
for the Secretariat of the Trust Fund to provide "demographic/statistical
data about the group of victims . . . ."77 When the TFV is acting in its
autonomous capacity, moreover, it seems that its assistance will almost in-
variably emancipate itself from the individual. The "collective victim" thus
seems like it will have its place in the Rome institutions' victim-oriented
policy, although what form either collective reparations or assistance will
take is not yet clear.
There is, moreover, a ratione temporis tension between backward-
looking initiatives and what might be described as more clearly forward-
looking ones. Reparation is classically past oriented, where the quantum of
reparation is calculated to compensate the harm caused. However, even rep-
aration awards can never fully escape the future, such as, for example, when
calculating lost prospects. The TFV is in a complex situation, and the tem-
poral position of its assistance for the benefit of victims is ambiguous. On
73 See Arturo J. Carrillo, Justice in Context: The Relevance of Inter-American
Human Rights Law and Practice to Repairing the Past, in THE HANDBOOK OF REP-
ARATIONs 504 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
74 ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 98(3).
75 Draft ICC Strategy, supra note 62.
76 For example, "where there are a number of applications, the Chamber may
consider the applications in such a manner as to ensure the effectiveness of the
proceedings and may issue one decision." ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 89(4).
77 TFV Regulations, supra note 31, para. 60.
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the one hand, assistance is destined for victims, who are presumably de-
fined by something that happened to them in the past, rather than classic
development aid beneficiaries, who have their assistance calculated merely
on the basis of need. On the other hand, rehabilitation is particularly inter-
ested in both the present and the future of the life experience of victims.
Therefore, TFV rehabilitation efforts may have a more permanent and
traceable effect than TFV assistance efforts. Nevertheless, the more "needs-
oriented" TFV assistance becomes, the harder the Trust will find it to justify
assisting certain victims rather than others, given the huge needs faced.
D. Contextual Problems
Finally, the operation of an ICC reparations regime arguably creates
what one might call "contextual problems," that is, problems that have to do
with how an appropriate victim-focused policy will distinguish itself from
other parallel concepts and efforts.
A first and clearly ill-conceived dimension of the reparations re-
gime is the connection between individual guilt, on the one hand, and state,
collective and international responsibility on the other. The international
criminal trial process can aspire to prove the guilt or innocence of a few,
and possibly their relative guilt, through variegated sentencing, but will per-
force leave aside the guilt and relative guilt of many more. The ICC is
geared towards ordering reparations as a result of having established indi-
vidual guilt 78 and not state responsibility. 79 In fact, because of international
criminal justice's ontological focus on the individual, international trials
have typically not been very good (and there is no reason to think that the
ICC would be any better) at understanding the sort of collective and struc-
tural phenomena which inevitably lie at the heart of mass atrocities. How-
78 See ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 98(1). Even collective reparations in the ICC
Rules must be related to "an award for reparations against a convicted person." Id.
Rule 98(3). At no point is there a suggestion that the Trust Fund could entirely
emancipate itself from determinations of individual guilt and related orders for rep-
aration by the Court. In other words, the Trust Fund is not a general reparations
fund, like the U.N. Torture Victims Fund, but, for all its independence, remains
subservient to the international criminal judicial process.
79 See Vincenzo Militello, The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsi-
bility and the ICC Statute, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 875 (2007); Fr6d6ric M6gret,
Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical Explanation Based on the
Legal Nature of Complementarity, in COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTAR-
ITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY
NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AMSTERDAM, 25/26 JUNE 2004
1 (Jann K. Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2004).
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ever, an international crime is always committed thanks to a whole
machinery, which includes systems of allegiances and complicities (no one
suggests that Hitler committed the Holocaust on his own, for example).
The ICC reparation regime risks reinforcing the model discussed
above to the extent that the basis for reparations remains, stricto sensu, the
determination of an individual's guilt. Although, technically, reparations
owed by individuals are certainly not exclusive of state- or internationally-
orchestrated reparations, there may be a potential for a "crowding effect,"
as international law seems to designate certain individuals as priority targets
for seeking reparations. The ICC was not the only option for victims of
international crimes to obtain reparations, and embedding the reparations
within a regime of determination of guilt comes with its own problems. In
order to avoid this, reparations should be seen as a way of collectivizing
guilt and responsibility, i.e., by going beyond, when possible, the discreet
crime of any particular individual to give due weight to the fact that many
international crimes will have been committed collectively. In doing so, the
international reparation regime can avoid some of the fictions of interna-
tional criminal justice.
The intervention of the TFV and the fact that it can provide more
general "assistance"80 can be seen as an informal acknowledgement that
something is lost by an excessive focus on individual guilt when it comes to
dealing with the actual needs of victims. Of course, voluntary contributions
by states or international organizations are in no way an acknowledgement
of responsibility or of an obligation to give, but there is a sense that the
TFV stands for a sort of "community interest" in no major crime going
without some sort of assistance. This is, in turn, related to the idea that the
difference between what a convicted person can pay, in terms of fines and
restitutions, and the total harm inflicted by that person, in terms of crimes,
is something that the international community should shoulder. When the
convicted person is the head of state or someone in high authority, as will
often be the case, ICC and TFV policy will necessarily (and if they do not,
they should) seek to partly bridge the gap between individual guilt and state
responsibility. Certainly, victims should not have to pay the consequences
of an artificial disaggregation of individual guilt from statist and collective
criminal endeavors. 8'
80 See ICC Rules, supra note 2, Rule 98(5) ("Other resources of the Trust Fund
may be used for the benefit of victims."). See also TFV Regulations, supra note 31,
para. 56.
81 Such as would result, for example, from indexing reparations to the degree to
which an accused contributed to mass atrocities, rather than the suffering resulting
from those atrocities in which he or she participated.
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A further challenge for the Rome victims' regime will be to suffi-
ciently distinguish its policies from other parallel policies undertaken in the
wake of atrocities. The regime was devised, and is often still spoken of, as
if it were going to unfold in a political and institutional void. In fact, it will
always unfold in the midst of a complex, multilayered process of both other
reparation (possibly involving state responsibility, truth and reconciliation
commissions, private law suits, etc.) and assistance programs involving hu-
manitarian, reconstruction and development efforts that focus or have an
impact on victims. Pablo de Grieff and Marieke Wierda have argued that
reparations programs should display a form of "external coherence," which
means that they must "bear a close relationship with other transitional jus-
tice mechanisms, that is, minimally, with prosecutions, truth telling, and
institutional reform." 82 The same could probably be said of the TFV's ac-
tions, which should be carefully coordinated with reparations efforts. For
example, given the scarcity of assistance available, it might make sense to
give aid or assistance as a matter of priority to those unlikely to obtain
reparations.
Assistance will also have to distinguish itself from more general
reconstruction efforts. If the ICC's key problem is that it is too judicial, the
TFV's problem may be that it is too much like a development agency and
not enough about transitional justice. At a certain level, assistance to vic-
tims may compete with other forms of aid and, indeed, be difficult to distin-
guish from them. The risk is that the TFV might become too disconnected
from the overall paradigm of either international criminal or transitional
justice in a way that would make it little more than one aid distributor
among many. In this context, TFV assistance cannot simply become synon-
ymous with any political, economic, social or cultural effort to mend a soci-
ety, or it will lose its specificity. Its distinguishing mark should remain that
it is awarded on the basis of recognition of a certain entitlement resulting
from harm suffered in the context of the commission of international
crimes, which is a much more specific mission than a general effort to pro-
vide aid.
M. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "SITES OF CONSCIENCE"
In the previous section, I have highlighted what I think are some of
the crucial tensions that will shape the practice of the Rome Statute's vic-
tims regime. In the process, I highlighted some of the limitations of said
regime, and made some general suggestions as to what sort of tools might
best address these limitations, with a particular focus on transitional justice
82 De Greiff & Wierda, supra note 57, at 14.
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concerns. In this section, I turn to an example of something which I think
could make the Court and the TFV mandates more complementary, realis-
tic, and just when it comes to victims. Rather than deductively inferring an
ideal reparations/assistance policy from the general rules of the ICC and
TFV, I now turn to a particular real world practice of transitional justice
arrangements, which might provide a very interesting niche for the interna-
tional reparations regime's "investments," i.e., "sites of conscience," which
are designed to commemorate major historical events, as well as certain
atrocities.
A. Monuments and Memory
The practice of commemorating traumatic events, the "communal
process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of the
past," 83 through the construction of sites of conscience is relatively wide-
spread, albeit diverse. Perhaps the most notorious of such sites are the mon-
uments to the dead that were constructed throughout the world following
the First World War. 84 Still, there are many other examples of such com-
memoration, which memorialize more domestic tragedies such as civil
war, 5 national disintegration, 8 6 genocide,'87 bloody coups88 ethnosectarian
11 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF S. AFR., REPORT 95 (2003).
84 See generally J. WINTER, SITES OF MEMORY, SITES OF MOURNING: THE GREAT
WAR IN EUROPEAN CULTURAL HISTORY (1995).
85 See generally The Henry Ford, Civil War Remembrance, http://www.
thehenryford.org/events/civilWarRemembrance.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2010);
Juanjo Igartua & Dario Paez, Art and Remembering Traumatic Collective Events:
The Case of the Spanish Civil War, in COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF POLITICAL EVENTS:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (James W. Pennebaker et al. eds., 1997).
86 See generally Chloe E. Hayim, The Burden of Memory: Reconciliation in Ser-
bia (2005) (unpublished dissertation, University of Bradford) (on file with author).
87 See generally J. Ledgerwood, The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genoci-
dal Crimes: National Narrative, 21 MUSEUM ANTHROPOLOGY 82 (1997); Com-
memoration of Genocide Against the Tutsis, Memorial Sites - Rwandan 15th
Commemoration of Tutsis Genocide, http://rwanda I 5.org/spip.php?rubrique 10 (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010); The Armenian Genocide Memorial Council of Glendale,
http://www.armeniangenocidemonument.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
88 See generally In Sup Han, Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atroc-
ities in South Korea, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 998 (2005); Teresa Meade, Holding the
Junta Accountable: Chile's "Sitios de Memoria" and the History of Torture, Dis-
appearance, and Death, 79 RADICAL HisT. REV. 123 (2001).
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violence,89 massive discrimination, 90 and political repression.9'
At times, monuments are specifically built for commemorative pur-
poses, at times, certain monuments are destroyed in particular symbolic
ways and yet, at other times, monuments that were symbolic of the criminal
regime are kept, although at counter-purpose. These monuments are evi-
dence and reminders of the past; they seek to commemorate certain events
by "embody[ing] the living memory of those who are missing - the aspira-
tion for closure and the enormity of the trauma." 92 Their inscription in space
creates a commemorative geography and, in "embody[ing] memory," 93 they
can "serve as vehicles for the intergenerational transmission of historical
memory." 94 Sites of conscience are, therefore, above all about "not forget-
ting," by creating special markers of suffering in the landscape.
In some cases, this attempt to preserve memory is particularly im-
portant because what was sought was the "disappearance" of certain per-
sons. "Disappearance" is distinct from killing in that the goal is to "achieve
impunity by violations . . . taking place in secret," making it a particularly
potent tool of rule by terror.95 In such situations, "victims often suffer their
loss in isolation with little social recognition of the injury inflicted on them.
In this context, publicly memorializing the missing through ... monuments
89 See generally Brian Graham & Yvonne Whelan, The Legacies of the Dead:
Commemorating the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 25 ENVIRONMENT AND PLAN-
NING D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 476 (2007).
90 See generally Erin Mosely, " Visualizing" Apartheid: Contemporary Art and
Collective Memory During South Africa's Transition to Democracy, 5 ANTiPODA
97 (2007).
91 See generally Nanci Adler, In Search of Identity: The Collapse of the Soviet
Union and the Recreation of Russia, in THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 275 (Alexandra Barahona De Brito et al.
eds., 2001); Patricia Tappatd de VALDEZ, El Pasado, un Tema Central del
Presente: La Bisqueda de Verdad y Justicia como Construccidn de una Ldgica
Democrdtica, in VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y REPARACION: DESAFfOS PARA LA
DEMOCRACIA Y LA CONVIVENCIA SOCIAL (Gilda Pacheco Oreamuno et al. eds,
2005).
92 Vasuki Nesiah, OvercomingTensions Between Family and Judicial Procedures,
84 INT'L R. RED CROSS 823, 841 (2002).
93 Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspec-
tive on Reparations in Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS
560, 567 (P. de Greiff ed., 2006).
94 Elizabeth Jelin, Public Memorialization in Perspective: Truth, Justice and
Memory of Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America, 1 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 138, 147 (2007).
95 Nesiah, supra note 92.
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can have enormous symbolic value in acknowledging the missing." 96 For
example, in the Santiago General Cemetery in Chile, a "Memorial for the
Disappeared" was erected, which includes the names of "more than three
thousand people disappeared and murdered" after the coup. 97
Sites of conscience also seem ideally suited to the needs of societies
where the destruction of memory has been the very aim of atrocities. There
may be a profound connection between the erection of new commemorative
monuments and the fact that monuments, commemorative or otherwise,
were destroyed as part of the commission of atrocities, such as in attempts
to destroy collective memory. As J. Muller put it, during the Yugoslav
wars, "[m]emory was literally blown up, as monuments, mosques and other
concrete manifestations of collective memory were erased . .. "98 It is as a
result of this that "mnemonic maps were rewritten as normative maps for an
ethnically reconfigured future." 99 The construction of memorial sites in this
context can be an attempt to recuperate the memory of something in partic-
ular, but it can also serve as an attempt to reclaim memory itself. To use
Pierre Nora's expression, these are "lieux de m6moire," sites "where mem-
ory crystallizes and secretes itself," partly because memory has ceased to
exist and, therefore, needs to be reconstituted. 00
B. Monuments and Transitional Justice
More generally, sites of conscience are perhaps significant tools of
transitional justice. As Artemis Christodulou put it, "the struggle for con-
trol over the national or 'collective' memory lies at the heart of post-con-
flict or post-authoritarian accountability policies."' 0 The commemoration
of the past, in other words, is not just an end in itself, but part of complex
96 Id.
97 Meade, supra note 88, at 131.
98 Jan-Werner Miller, Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power
and the Power over Memory, in MEMORY AND POWER IN POST-WAR EUROPE:
STUDIES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST 1, 17 (Jan-Werner Miller ed., 2002).
99 Id.
100 Pierra Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mimoire, 26 REPRE-
SENTATIONs 7 (1989).
101 ARTEMIS CHRISTODULOU, SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMM'N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILI-
ATION COMMISSION, APPENDIX 4 (2004), para. 2, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/TRCDocuments.html (follow "Appendices" hyperlink) (last visited Apr.
12, 2010) [hereinafter Appendix 4]. See also Jelin, supra note 94 (speaking of the
". . . constant interaction between state and societal actors in the struggle for under-
standing and interpreting past violence and repression.").
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processes of transitional justice that have been analyzed relatively early on
in terms of not just remembering, but also apportioning guilt, highlighting
truth, and facilitating reconciliation.10 2 Although typically not vindictive or
vengeful, sites of conscience often designate the authors of atrocities, either
implicitly or explicitly. They contain either complex or distilled truths about
an event or a period, its causes and its consequences. By serving as rallying
and meeting points, they can also contribute to reconciliation and be seen as
"attempts to reaffirm a feeling of collective belonging and an identity
rooted in a tragic and traumatic history." 03 In some cases, commemorative
monuments can act as "counter-monuments" to some earlier attempts to
monumentally glorify, for example, nationalist ambition. 104
Monuments are also tools of transitional justice in a more sophisti-
cated way. A whole stream of literature sees such sites as not simply "prod-
uct," but rather as "process." 0 The process of coming to terms with the
past and determining what should be the best sort of monument is itself part
of the healing. As one author notes, the building of monuments leads to
"largely symbolic struggles over different ways in which historical events
should be remembered." 06 Monuments in transitional justice efforts serve
"as a tool of participatory remembrance," 07 especially where the fight over
102 See NEIL J. KRITZ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES xlx-xxx (1st ed. 1995). "Following the initial
phase of transition, this history may be reaffirmed in the long-term through ... the
construction of museums and commemorative monuments." Id. at xxvi.
103 Jelin, supra note 94.
104 On the use of the Kosovo Polje monument as a symbol of Serbian ambitions,
see Karen E. Till, Places of Memory, in A COMPANION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
289, 289-301 (John A. Agnew et al. eds., 2003).
105 As Artemis Christodulou put it, "[m]emorialising is a social and political act
that encompasses not just the memorial itself, but also the process of creating the
memorial, the creation of the memorial and the continued engagement with the
memorial." Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 3.
106 Neil J. Smelser, Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma, in CULTURAL
TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 31, 50 (2004).
107 Joanna Quinn, The Role of Informal Mechanisms in Transitional Justice 4
(2005) (working paper), available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca.papers-2005/Quinn.
pdf. See also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 140 (1998). Martha Minow de-
scribes the way that memorials to victims of conflict can "occasion the productive
if painful kind of struggle for memory as do fights over reparations. Vividly captur-
ing and recasting memory, fights over monuments in the streets and in debates
usefully disturb congealed memories and mark important junctions between the
past and a newly invented present." Id.
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monuments and their symbolism was a substantial part of the conflict it-
self. 08 Memorials can also help to "humanize and re-politicize the vic-
tims." 09 Obviously, building monuments cannot be a substitute for a
complex process of reckoning with the past,"i0 but it can help to crystallize
debates around a number of stylized dilemmas. The construction of monu-
ments can also be a way to encourage civil society appropriation"' and
ensure that commemoration is compatible with local culture.12
Finally, there is clearly a forward-looking, future-oriented dimen-
sion to commemorative monument building. Monuments stand as implicit
condemnations of the faults of a past regime. They act as a reminder for
future generations of certain dangers and places through which "contempo-
rary dreams of national futures are imagined."" 3 "By stimulating an on-
going dialogue necessary for building and sustaining a peaceful, democratic
society after long periods of violence and repression," argues Artemis
Christodulou, "memorials may serve as catalysts for social change."ll 4 As
one author put it:
1os See generally Brandon Hamber & Grainne Kelly, A Place for Reconciliation?
Conflict and Locality in Northern Ireland, Democratic Dialogue Report 18 (Demo-
cratic Dialogue, Belfast, Ir.), Sept. 25, 2005, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/dd/
report I 8/ddreportl 8.pdf.
109 Katherine Hite, 'The Eye that Cries': The Politics of Representing Victims in
Contemporary Peru, 5 A CONTRACORRIENTE 108, 130 (2007), available at http:/
www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente/fall_07/Hite.pdf.
11o See Graham & Whelan, supra note 89, at 476 (discussing the dangers of putting
commemoration before actual reconciliation). See also Alexander Segovia, The
Reparations Proposals of the Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Haiti: A His-
tory of Noncompliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 154, 160 (Pablo de
Greiff ed., 2006).
"' See Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 16 ("There is an important citizenship
role in memorials that is often lacking from high-level strategies that risk alienating
those they seek to help by complex legal or bureaucratic procedures. There is more
public resonance in an accessible and enduring public space than in a lengthy piece
of statistical analysis of human rights violations.").
112 See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONs 196 (2002) (discussing the possibilities of commemorating
the Cambodian genocide in a way that is consonant with Buddhist beliefs). See also
Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 21-22. ("Establishing a successful memorial in
Sierra Leone requires the integration of traditional and cultural methods of memori-
alisation into the more generalized scheme" of memorialisation.). Id. para. 21.
113 KAREN E. TILL, THE NEW BERLIN: MEMORY, POLITICS, PLACE 193 (2005).
114 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 13.
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A memorial constitutes a warning about hazardous devel-
opments in the here and now or in the future by means of
referring to the past. A memorial is a means to (re)write
history - which has often been distorted or denied. A me-
morial may be an important element in preventing future
violations of human rights.115
By the same token, the role of sites of memory is not to impose a
particular memory, but often to create an occasion for memorializing. It has
been said of the Hector Pieterson memorial in Soweto (named for a 12 year-
old schoolboy who was one of the first victims of police repression during a
riot), that "[i]t is a unique space where contemporary South Africans and
future generations can contemplate memories both painful and problematic,
providing its visitors with multiple and even conflicting narratives that al-
low for a more complex understanding of our role in shaping the future."' 1 6
In light of all of the above, it is not surprising that the absence of such
"lieux de memoire" is often seen as a substantial obstacle to the construc-
tion of a collective memory that might allow a society to surmount past
grievances."17
C. Monuments and Victims
As tools of transitional justice, there is no doubt that commemora-
tive monuments have a particular value for victims and their relatives, and
that this value is itself integral to the larger transitional justice efforts." 8
15 Daan Bronkhorst, 'Truth and Justice': A Guide to Truth Commissions and
Transitional Justice, 57 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://www.amnesty.nl/
documenten/truth-and-justice.pdf.
116 Ali Khangela Hlongwane & Angel David Nieves, supra note 29, at 366. See
also Int'l Conf. of the Red Cross & Red Crescent [ICRC], The Missing and Their
Families: Action to Resolve the Problem of People Unaccounted for as a Result of
Armed Conflict or Internal Violence and to Assist their Families, 03/IC/10, Dec. 2-
6, 2003, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5XRDJR/
$File/ICRCreporttheMissingANGFINAL.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Report].
" See generally KASPER BLOCH-JORGENSEN ET AL., ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION
IN LEBANON? (May 2006) (dissertation, Roskilde Universitetscenter), available at
http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/1833/1/Achieving%20Reconciliation%20in%20
Lebanon%20-%2OFardigt%20projekt.pdf.
118 Even outside the judicial context, the building of such monuments has often
been "conceived as part of the moral reparations for, and vindication of, the vic-
tims." ELIZABETH LIRA, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in
Chile, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 55, 62 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
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As has been mentioned, victims will often be in need of something
quite different than purely financial reparations or assistance. A widespread
tendency is to assume that victims want monetary compensation above all.
In fact, sociological research has shown that, in some transitional scenarios,
demands or offers for money can raise delicate problems, including "a cer-
tain sense of guilt for demanding a payment of money,"' 19 especially in the
case of disappearances.120 Historically, victims have been very interested
and, at times, even more interested, in non-monetary forms of reparations,
such as satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.121 To highlight the
importance of such reparations is also to emphasize the extent to which
victims are not simply "economic," but also social and political beings, who
have at heart not simply their own fate, and not simply the extent to which
they can obtain financial help, but also an interest in broader transitional
justice processes. That there is strong interest for non-monetary reparations
is evident in the way victims themselves frequently insist on the construc-
tion of monuments, often putting pressure on the state 22 or demanding such
reparations from international institutions.
The very existence of commemorative monuments is a tribute to the
victims and becomes "part of a process of 'redress,"' or healing.123 The
commemoration of suffering and victims' lives is a significant and possibly
quite contemporary departure from an earlier trend of "statues and plaques
commemorating war heroes," in which memorials are "increasingly being
conceived as challenges to rather than as bulwarks of dominant discourses
of collective memory." 24 Monuments "provide an avenue for acknowledg-
ment that may be particularly significant in meeting families' needs to me-
morialize their loved ones and the extent of the loss suffered by them and
their communities." 2 5 1In such cases:
119 MARIA Jost GUEMBE, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Viola-
tions: The Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 21, 37
(Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006)
120 See id. at 37-38.
121 See id. at 38.
122 For example, in El Salvador, "human rights NGOs have joined together and in
1998 persuaded San Salvador's mayor to set aside part of the city's Cuscathin Park
for a monument to the civilian victims of the war." U.S. INST. PEACE, EL SALVA-
DOR: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS 13 (Margarita S. Studemeister ed.,
2001), available at http://www.dplf.org/uploads/ll90927825.pdf.
123 BRONKHORST, supra note 115, at 57.
124 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 7.
125 Nesiah, supra note 92, at 840.
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For the relatives the monument has special signifi-
cance. In addition to rehabilitation, it also has a humanizing
function. Victims of human rights violations from the past
are often anonymous: the dead, the 'disappeared' person. A
monument turns this abstract category into concrete and
personal victims. The victims become people of flesh and
blood. 126
Monuments can also have a significant role in "restoring the good
name of victims" in cases where a historical legacy has tarnished that
name.127
Among the most convincing descriptions of the way in which sites
of conscience can help victims is Yael Danieli's extrapolation from the
words of Elie Wiesel that victims of the many atrocities "have no ceme-
tery; we are their cemetery."1 2 8 In that respect, according to Danieli:
Building monuments serves some important func-
tions in the reestablishment of a sense of continuity for the
survivors, and for the world. Much of the chronic grief, the
holding on to the guilt, shame, and pain of the past have to
do with these internally carried graveyards. Survivors fear
that successful mourning may lead to letting go, thereby to
forgetting the dead and committing them to oblivion. The
attempt to make these graveyards external creates the need
for building monuments so that the survivors might have a
place to go to remember and mourn in a somewhat tradi-
tional way.129
Danieli cites the Yad Vashem as an example of such a monument,
and indeed the Yad Vashem has served a crucial role as a focal point in
remembering the victims of the Holocaust, for example, with the "memory
room" and the "name room," while at the same time serving as a shrine,
memorial, art gallery, archive, research centre, library and museum.130
126 Bronkhorst, supra note 115, at 58. See also HAMBER, supra note 93, at 566.
127 See ANDREw RIGBY, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER THE VIOLENCE 10
(2001).
128 Yael Danieli, Essential Elements of Healing After Massive Trauma: Complex
Needs Voiced by Victims/Survivors, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 343,
352 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006).
129 Id.
130 See id.
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Concretely, sites of remembrance provide places of mourning, rem-
iniscence and contemplation for victims and their relatives, 131 and thus are
of very direct use to those who might be deprived of them otherwise, such
as people who do not have a tomb.132 They are also a way of meshing the
private and the public, the individual and the collective, in a way that can
give meaning to suffering and highlight solidarity with victims.1 33 In many
ways, sites of remembrance can help extend the circle of victims to a num-
ber of people who may not have been victimized directly as a result of
atrocities, but who will have suffered immensely from them.
The strong connection that victims and their relatives have with
monuments is also highlighted in the way that their presence and participa-
tion in the design of monuments is felt to be particularly necessary. As
Vasuki Nesiah put it, "memorials are most likely to be sources of healing
and closure for the families if the families of the missing are consulted in
their design and implementation." 34 In practice, demands for the construc-
tion of commemorative sites have often come from victims and their orga-
nizations themselves, whether in Ethiopia, 35 Chile,136 or Bosnia.137 Indeed,
there has been a noticeable phenomenon in the re-appropriation of the de-
sign of monuments by civil society in general,138 to the point that one author
131 See HAMBER, supra note 93, at 566 (Such sites are "focal points in the grieving
process.").
132 See WINTER, supra note 84.
133 See Catherine Moriarty, Private Grief and Public Remembrance: British First
World War Memorials, in WAR AND MEMORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 125,
126 (Martin Evans & Ken Lunn eds., 1997).
134 Nesiah, supra note 92, at 841.
135 See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, The Status of Human
Rights Organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa Ethiopia, http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/africalethiopia.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (discussing Anti-Red Ter-
ror Committee, an Ethiopian NGO established in 1991 to represent the victims and
families of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Mengistu regime. One of its
key goals has been the building of a monument to commemorate the victims of
"Red terror.").
136 See Victoria Baxter, Civil Society Promotion of Truth, Justice, and Reconcilia-
tion in Chile: Villa Grimaldi, 30 PEACE & CHANGE 120, 126 (2005). See also Lira,
supra note 118.
137 See Women's Feminist - Antimilitarist Peace Organization, Don't Ever Forget
the Genocide in Srebrenica, http://www.zeneucmom.org/index.php?option=com
content&task=view&lang=en&id=462 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
138 See Mark H. Oseil, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massa-
cre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 653 (1995) (". . . whereas war memorials were long
secretly designed by elites, today the form that they should take is routinely de-
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has argued that "[e]ach and every decision to build a monument, to set up
spaces for memory in places where serious affronts to human dignity were
committed . . . is the result of the initiative and the commitment of social
advocacy groups that act as memory entrepreneurs."l 39 This is, therefore,
clearly something that victims' families feel strongly about.
Finally, it should be stressed that monuments are also about recog-
nition of responsibility, typically of the state or state officials, and, there-
fore, make a point "about those giving or granting" reparations.140 Their
construction and their symbolism "tienen que ver no s6lo con el co-
nocimiento sino sobre todo con el reconocimiento ptiblico y oficial sobre
los hechos del pasado."l41 Hence, the importance of memorializing is em-
phasized because "the very act of public acknowledgement of suffering
contributes significantly to the healing process." 42 It must be said in this
respect that monuments, which, as will be seen in the next section, typically
fall under the heading of "satisfaction" as a form of reparation, provide
evidence of a commitment to non-repetition, another form of reparation. 143
They may provide opportunities for those individually responsible to ex-
press remorse at the pain caused.
IV. MONUMENTS AS REPARATION AND ASSISTANCE: THE RECORD
Saying that the building of sites of conscience is a common prac-
tice, and that such sites are important tools of transitional justice bearing
particular relevance to victims, is not the same thing as fitting them into
practices of either reparation or assistance. After all, given the meager
amount of both reparation and assistance money available, it may be that
funds for building monuments should come from other sources than the
Rome institutions. Indeed, in response to the TFV's suggestion that it might
be involved in "reconciliation" efforts, which, one presumes, might include
bated in society at large and in the local communities that often sponsor and house
them.").
139 ELIZABETH JELIN, STATE REPRESSION AND THE LABORS OF MEMORY 39 (Judy
Rein & Marcial Godoy-Anativia trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2003).
140 HAMBER, supra note 93, at 566.
141 Their construction and their symbolism "have to do not only with knowledge
but, above all, with public and official recognition of what was done in the past."
MARCELA CEBALLOS, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACION, REPOBLICA DE
COLOMBIA, EL PAPEL DE LAS COMISIONES EXTRAJUDICIALES DE INVESTIGACION Y
DE LAS COMISIONES DE VERDAD EN Los PROCESOS DE PAz: ASPECTOs TE6RICOS Y
EXPERIENCIA INTERNACIONAL 9 (2002) (emphasis added).
142 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 3.
143 HAMBER, supra note 93, at 567.
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the building of commemorative sites, one group of NGOs suggested that
reconciliation "is not necessarily a victim-centered activity."'4
Historically, the construction of commemorative monuments has
had a noticeable, albeit marginal, overall role in the theory of reparation,
particularly as a form of symbolic reparation. This is obviously not to say
that the construction of such monuments cannot be fit into a broader prac-
tice of victim-oriented "assistance" as will be managed by the TFV. In this
section, I will examine three sources of the idea that commemorative monu-
ments are a type of reparation: the UN's work on reparation principles, the
work of truth and reconciliation commissions and the Inter-American
Court's practice.
A. Monuments as Victim Reparation
1. The UN's Work on Reparation
The Victims Declaration is notable for incorporating an element of
"satisfaction" as reparation by including, aside from restitution, both com-
pensation and rehabilitation.14 5 Satisfaction, which has been described as
the "[1]esser known . . . manner of providing reparations," 46 refers to a
number of measures whose goal is to tackle the more emotional, psycholog-
ical, and even symbolic aspects of victims' suffering.147 These can include a
whole series of measures such as formal apologies accompanied by actions
that aim to raise public awareness of the atrocity committed. Such actions
may include research, education and impartial mass communication, as well
as funds to support all of these and, of course, the establishment of memo-
rial days or monuments.148
Very tellingly, satisfaction measures have also been held to incor-
porate the construction of the actual "sites of conscience" which are the
object of this article. The van Boven study affirms that reparations include
satisfaction which, in turn, includes "[c]ommemorations and tributes to the
victims . . . ."149 The Joinet report refers to "[c]ommemorative ceremonies,
144 Comments on Global Strategic Plan, supra note 8, at 3.
145 See Victims Declaration, supra note 28.
146 Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: a New Fron-
tier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 483 (Pablo de Grieff ed., 2006).
147 See id.
148 See Max du Plessis, Reparations and International Law: How are Reparations
to be Determined (Past Wrong or Current Effects), Against Whom, and What Form
Should they Take?, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. AcCESS TO JUST. 41, 68-69 (2003).
149 Van Boven Report, supra note 27, para. 22(g).
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naming of public thoroughfares or the erection of monuments,"o50 and Bas-
siouni mentions "[c]ommemorations and tributes to the victims . .. "151 It is
that last formulation that made its way into the General Assembly resolu-
tion. 152 The Joinet report is noteworthy for highlighting the need for collec-
tive measures. 153 It emphasizes that, "[o]n a collective basis, symbolic
measures intended to provide moral reparation, such as formal recognition
by the State of its responsibility, or official declarations aimed at restoring
victims' dignity . . . help to discharge the duty of remembrance." 5 4 The
UN's work has influenced a number of domestic and regional bodies. For
example, a draft EU Recommendation for Assistance to Victims of Acts of
Terrorism indicates that "[m]ember states are encouraged . . . to consider
taking other [reparative] measures [including] . . . [c]ommemorations and
tributes to the victims and first responders."' 55
2. The Inter-American System Experience
Although the record of truth and reconciliation commissions in
dealing with "sites of conscience" remains limited because of their often-
limited powers, there is at least one instance of a court becoming heavily
involved in ordering the construction of various monuments as reparations.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is by far the most ac-
tive international body in considering that some form of monument con-
struction can constitute an appropriate form of reparation. The ground has
been prepared by a clear awareness that "damages should be compensated
not only in monetary terms, but also through measures that show the rela-
tives and . . . society that events such as these are not going to recur." 56
"Moral damages," in particular, "involve making reparation to the individu-
als for the pain and suffering inflicted on them."' 5 7 In the judgments of the
Inter-American Court, such compensation often comes under the heading
"other forms of reparation," and typically designates compensation that ex-
tends "beyond emotional distress to encompass other prejudicial effects on
150 Joinet Report, supra note 27, para. 42.
151 Bassiouni Report, supra note 27, para. 25(g).
152 Victims Declaration, supra note 28, para. 22(g).
153 See Joinet Report, supra note 27, para. 40.
154 Id. para. 42.
15 Proposal for EU Recommendation for Assistance to Victims of Acts of Terror-
ism 6 (2008), http://www.euforumrj.org/readingroom/Terrorism/DesvictEURecO6
08.pdf.
156 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Bolivia, 204,
OEA/Ser.L.V/H, Doc. 8 rev. 1 (1997).
157 Id.
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the dignity and well-being of the victims that, unlike personal suffering,
cannot be compensated financially even in nominal terms."' 58
Often in the past, the idea of constructing a monument originated
with the victims,' 59 was subsequently supported by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights,160 and eventually was ratified by the Inter-
American Court as part of its review of "compliance agreements" con-
cluded between the State and the injured parties. At times, the idea to order
the state to construct a monument came from the Commission itself,161 with
the support of the victims. At times, it is states themselves that have volun-
teered the building of monuments as part of compliance agreements 62
which have been ratified by the Commission. Sometimes, the compliance
measures are offered in exchange for an end to domestic and international
actions engaging their responsibility. There is no consistent terminology
used by the Inter-American Court to describe the sort of monuments that
should be built, but expressions such as "monument of atonement" 6 3 or
"memorial monument"M are common and point in the same direction.
The Inter-American Court has denied few requests for the construc-
tion of monuments as reparations, although it has sometimes acknowledged
that lesser measures, such as naming and inaugurating a school with the
name of the victim, would be enough.165 Typically, commemoration has
been a form of reparation reserved for relatively grave or systematic viola-
tions of human rights. A violation of the right to life is almost always in-
volved, frequently alongside a violation of the rights to personal liberty,
personal integrity and humane treatment.16 6 Sometimes, the initiative has
158 Carrillo, supra note 73, at 525.
159 See I/A Court H.R., TRUJILLO-OROZA case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series
C, No. 92.
160 Id. 92(1).
161 See I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series
C, No. 124, 218; I/A Court H.R., Myrna Mack Chang case, Judgment of Nov. 25,
2003, Series C, No. 101, 260(e).
162 Carmelo Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 19/03,
OEA/Ser.L./V.II. 118, doc. 70 rev. 2, 588 (2003).
163 Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
105/05, OEA/Ser.L./VIII.124, doc. 5 (2005).
164 I/A Court H.R., Barrios Altos case, Judgment of Nov. 30, 2001, Series C., No.
87, 44(f).
165 See I/A Court H.R., TRUJILO-OROZA case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series
C, No. 92, 122.
166 See Carmelo Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 19!
03, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003).
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been to commemorate one relatively prominent individual involved in ac-
tivities such as the defense of human rights, as was the case with Myrna
Mack Chang,167 or to memorialize an emblematic figure of opposition to an
oppressive government, such as Carmelo Soria Espinoza.168 On other occa-
sions, however, the monument is supposed to commemorate a more collec-
tive form of victimization, as does the memorial for the massacre of
children in Colombia, in which the state erected a monument with a plaque
in a park in the city of Medellin to "commemorate the victims, make moral
amends and express atonement to the families." 69
Several goals are presented as being pursued by the construction of
memorials. Even though a connection with victims is almost always made,
at times the Inter-American Court comes close to treating monuments as
essentially commemorative devices in service of transitional justice. For ex-
ample, Judge Cangado Trindade has insisted on how a particular monument
"defies the passing of time, or intends to do so" and stands "as a lesson that
everyone must persevere in the search of their own redemption."170 One
goal is simply the sort of backward-looking process of healing and repara-
tion directed at the victims and their relatives. For example, the agreement
in the case of Villatina Massacre v. Colombia "established that ... [t]he
National Government and the petitioners wish to reiterate, in this friendly
settlement agreement, that the purpose of building a work of art is to com-
memorate the children, as well as make moral amends and provide repara-
tions to the families of the victims."' 7' On other occasions, there is mention
of "keeping the victim's memory alive"l 72 and "maintain[ing] remembrance
of the victim."l 7 3 In the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison case, the Court spoke
167 See I/A Court H.R., Myrna Mack Chang case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2003,
Series C, No. 101.
168 See Carmelo Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 19/
03, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003).
169 Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
105/05, OEA/Ser.L./VII.124, doc. 5, 25 (2005).
170 I/A Court H.R., Concurring opinion of Judge A.A. Cangado Trindade, Miguel
Castro-Castro Prison case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2006, Series C., No. 160, 20.
'' Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
105/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5, 25 (2005).
172 I/A Court H.R., TRUJILLO-OROZA case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series C,
No. 92, 122.
73 I/A Court H.R., Myrna Mack Chang case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2003, Series C,
No. 101, 1286.
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of an "acknowledgment of the suffering of the victims and . . . an expres-
sion of solidarity to them."I 74
However, there is also clearly a more forward-looking and societal
dimension to reparations involving memorials. In the Moiwana Village
case, for example, Suriname agreed to "establish a memorial" referring to
the events of Moiwana to serve as "a reminder to the whole nation of what
happened and what may not [be] repeat[ed] in the future."17 The Court
itself emphasized that the dual purpose of the monument should be "to me-
morialize the events of November 29, 1986, as well as to prevent the recur-
rence of such dreadful actions in the future."' 7 6 In other cases, there is
mention of "raising public awareness about the need to avoid the repetition
of harmful acts."' 77
The link between the personal form of reparations and the more
general exemplary value of reparations for society at large is exemplified by
the request, by the mother of one killed by state agents, that the Govern-
ment of Bolivia construct a monument in memory of her son because "this
would allow future generations to learn about this part of Bolivia's history
and because the next of kin of detained-disappeared persons have the right
to perpetuate in some way the memory of the youth who died because they
disagreed with the political system."178 This case is an interesting example
of reparation ordered on behalf of one person (here the victim's relative),
but where that person seeks to leave a deeper social trace and, as it were,
donate some of her reparation to society at large and to posterity. As can be
seen from such examples, there may in some cases be very little difference
between reparations as an individualized concept and efforts at transitional
justice more generally.
Also of interest, and apart from the principle of monument con-
struction, are the specifics relating to how, when and where these monu-
ments should be constructed. Obviously, as symbolic reparations,
monuments represent considerable stakes for all those involved, starting
with their more immediate beneficiaries. The Inter-American Court could
174 I/A Court H.R., Concurring opinion of Judge A.A. Cangado Trindade, Miguel
Castro-Castro Prison case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2006, Series C., No. 160, 1 19.
17 I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series C,
No. 124, 218.
176 Id.
1' See I/A Court H.R., Trujillo-Oroza case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series C,
No. 92, 122; I/A Court H.R., Myrna Mack Chang case, Judgment of Nov. 25,
2003, Series C, No. 101, 286.
178 I/A Court H.R., Trujillo-Oroza case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series C, No.
92, 46.
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not simply order the state to build a monument without providing particular
details as to its construction at the risk of a monument being built that was
unsuited to its purpose. There is a demand from the relatives of victims to
not let the process of memorialization be appropriated by the state, but in-
stead be something over which the relatives retain a substantial amount of
control. This is something to which Inter-American system institutions have
been sensitive.
In practice, the Inter-American Court has gone quite a long way in
determining modalities of construction, often ratifying and supervising
complex agreements between parties. Some of these agreements are proce-
dural, meaning that they relate to the conditions in which the monument
should be built. Other agreements are substantive, meaning that they relate
to the final product, including the size, shape and content of the monument.
Echoing the more general line of reasoning identified above, that monu-
ments are not simply about outcome, but also about process, a distinct effort
has been made to "proceduralize" construction. Of particular importance is
the need for consultation of relevant parties. In several cases, the Court has
ordered that the design be made "in consultation with and taking fully into
account the wishes of the survivors and family members of those killed," 79
that "all aspects related to it should be agreed with the victim's mother and
brothers," 80 that "design and location shall be decided upon in consultation
with the victims' representatives"' 8' and that the location of a monument
"be agreed among the parties." 82
The Court is also willing to be quite detailed about the final nature
of the monument. This applies, firstly, to location. The State should not be
179 I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series C,
No. 124, 197(d).
180 I/A Court H.R., TRUJILLO-OROZA case, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Series C,
No. 92, 91(d).
181 I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series C,
No. 124, 218.
182 I/A Court H.R., Barrios Altos case, Judgment of Nov. 30, 2001, Series C., No.
87, 1 44(f). A good example of the level of detail that the Inter-American Court is
willing to get into is provided by the Villatina Massacre case, where the Court
approved the terms of the friendly settlement agreement between the Colombian
State and the petitioners to the IACHR, specifying, inter alia, that :
(2) The petitioners and the Office of the Mayor of Medellin
shall each submit two names of artists to invite them to present
proposals, in accordance with the terms of reference that the Ad-
ministrative Department of the Office of the President will be
providing in due time.
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allowed, obviously, to locate the monument in a place where its value both
to victims and society would be less than it should be. The Court thus regu-
larly speaks of a "suitable public location" 83 or "a suitable public place." 8 4
Sometimes, the emphasis is on the relationship of the memorial to the per-
son or persons it is supposed to commemorate.' 8 Other times, the emphasis
is on the visibility of the monument for society more generally.186 At times,
the location is not simply described in general terms, but as a choice be-
tween specific locations, such as in the Villatina Massacre case, where the
Court-sanctioned agreement anticipated that the monument would be built
in one of three parks in the city of Medellin. 8 7
Another common feature in the Court's case law is the specification
of time frame for the construction. Again, the concern is that, left to their
own devices, states might unduly prolong the process. Typically, dates are
set for completion. In the Moiwana Village case, for example, the Court
indicated that the monument "shall be completed within one year from the
date of notification of the instant judgment." 88 In the Barrios Altos case,
the monument was to be "in place within 60 days of the signing of the
agreement."' 89 Intermediary deadlines may also be set, such as the time that
a municipal office has to obtain necessary building permits.190
(3) The parties agreed that the petitioners would have the right
to suggest some parameters in the terms of reference for hiring
the artist.
Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 105/
05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5, 25 (2005).
183 I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series C,
No. 124, 1218.
184 Id. 1990).
185 ".... in the region of Guatemala where she worked intensely." I/A Court H.R.,
Myrna Mack Chang case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2003, Series C, No. 101,
270(d)(iii). ". . . at the place where she died or nearby, with a reference to the
activities she carried out." Id. 286.
186 ". . . in an important location, where there is a substantial flow of traffic, in the
center of Santa Cruz." I/A Court H.R., TRUJILLO-OROZA case, Judgment of Feb. 27,
2002, Series C, No. 92, 91(d).
187 Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
105/05, OEA/Ser.L./III.124, doc. 5, 25 (2005).
188 I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Village case, Judgment of June 15, 2005, Series C,
No. 124, 1 218.
199 1/A Court H.R., Barrios Altos case, Judgment of Nov. 30, 2001, Series C., No.
87, 1 44(f).
190 See Villatina Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 105/05, OEA/Ser.L./VIII. 124, doc. 5, 25 (2005) ("The Office of the Mayor of
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The Court also often specifies who shall take care of the process of
construction and identifying specific actors, as well as how such individuals
are to be designated. The settlement in the Villatina Massacre petition is an
example of a complex, multi-party arrangement involving the petitioners,
leading public authorities and the IACHR.191 The intention is obviously that
the highest political levels of the state, such as the President of the Republic
in Villatina Massacre, be involved in direct consultation with the petition-
ers, and under some form of international supervision. Other indications as
to participants have a more "qualitative" nature, such the requirement in
Villatina Massacre that the artist commissioned to do the work was to
"have some personal or professional experience in the field of human rights
or in similar or related areas."1 9 2
Finally, the actual shape, design and form of the monument are
often indicated, in at least some general way, to take into account the desire
of the petitioners. For example, in Villatina Massacre, the Court confirmed
that the following requests of the petitioners should be taken into account:
"a) that the work of art be made of bronze, b) that the work of art be com-
prised of 9 elements which should be clearly identifiable as the 9 victims, c)
that the project include the complete remodeling of the public space that
will be used .. ". 193 Particularly important are various plaques explaining
the significance of the monument, which on its own might give relatively
few clues. The short descriptions contained on the plaques are of intense
importance from both a reparations and transitional justice point of view.
On some occasions, judgments indicate what should not appear on the
plaque.194 However, most often, judgments dictate what must be included,
Medellin, in turn, has five days as of the date of the signing of the inter-administra-
tive agreement to obtain the necessary permits issued by Municipal Planning.").
191 Id. 1 25(4) ("The contracting process will be conducted directly by the Admin-
istrative Department of the Office of the President, which will also supervise imple-
mentation of the contract, without detriment to the collaboration of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the petitioners in the latter activity. In this hiring process, on
the basis of what was agreed, a proposal evaluation committee will be set up with
the participation of a person designated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one by
the petitioners in coordination with IACHR, and one by the Office of the President
of the Republic.").
192 Id. 25(3).
193 Id. 25.
194 Id. ("The plaque will not bear the name of any national, departmental, or mu-
nicipal authority.").
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which is typically the names of all victims and their age when they died.'95
Court-ratified plaques go quite far in linking the monument explicitly to
state liability and reparation. 196
Also of interest is the fact that, on occasion, the Court has indicated
the conditions in which the monument should be unveiled, including the
nature of the relevant ceremony. For example, the monument following the
Villatina Massacre was to be "installed during a public ceremony attended
by representatives of the National Government and local government, the
families of the victims, and the petitioners." 97 Such is the willingness of the
Court to have the upper hand on the construction process that it has some-
times intervened to require modifications of existing monuments to honor
victims. For example, in the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison case, after Peru
complained that there already was a commemorative monument,198 the
Court insisted that, although the existing monument constituted "an impor-
tant public acknowledgment to the victims of violence in Peru," the State
was to ensure that, within a year, "all the people declared as deceased vic-
tims in the present Judgment be represented in said monument." 99
B. Monuments as Victim Assistance
In a sense, if commemorative monuments can be ordered as repara-
tion, then afortiori their construction can be encouraged as a form of assis-
tance to victims. Indeed, the building of such monuments has at times been
described as a typical "non-judicial mechanism." 2 00 Truth and reconciliation
195 This was the case in the Villatina Massacre, where the youngest victim was 8
years old. Id.
196 See id. The Villatina Massacre plaque is to include the following mention:
The Colombian Government recognized its responsibility to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS and to
Colombian society for the violation of human rights in this seri-
ous crime, chargeable to State agents.
This monument is a way to commemorate the victims, make
moral amends and express atonement to the families, and al-
though it is not enough to ease the pain produced by this action, it
has become a fundamental step for justice to be done and to re-
mind Colombians that crimes of this nature cannot be repeated.
Id.
I97 Id. 21.
198 I/A Court H.R., Miguel Castro-Castro Prison case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2006,
Series C., No. 160, 142.
199 Id. 454.
200 See ICRC Report, supra note 116, at 9.
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commissions are perhaps most emblematic of a soft practice of encouraging
the construction of commemorative monuments as an integral part of victim
assistance that is not particularly tied to reparation. Truth and reconciliation
commissions are interesting in relation to the international criminal tribu-
nals in that they are supposed to have a birds-eye view of proceedings,
consequently encompass a more general take on the exigencies of transition
and, therefore, be less prone to some of the simplifications of criminal jus-
tice. As a result, such commissions have arguably been at the forefront of
proposing the creation of commemorative monuments as part of
reparations.
The Salvadoran, 201 Honduran, 202 Guatemalan, 203 and Chilean Com-
missions204 all recommended the building of some form of moment incor-
porating the names of all victims in the conflict, to honor those who died
and preserve the memory of the victims. The South African Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission considered that public memorials, such as muse-
ums and monuments, were "[s]ymbolic reparation" for damage done to the
entire South African society.205 Although not all of these recommendations
for monuments were implemented, 20 6 it is revealing that they were consid-
ered to be part of the "package" of transitional justice.
The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Sierra Le-
one indicated "great interest in the creation of memorials," 207 and that the
commission would "encourage" and "where necessary, participate in dis-
cussions within the communities on the erection of monuments and memo-
201 See United Nations, COMM'N ON THE TRuTH FOR EL SAL., From Madness to
Hope: the 12-Year War in El Salvador, § IV(B)(1), (1993), available at http://
www.lemoyne.edulPortals/11/pdf-content/ElSalvador-Report.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2010).
202 See Mike Kaye, The Role of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice, Rec-
onciliation and Democratisation: the Salvadorean and Honduran Cases, 29 J. LAT.
AMER. STUD. 693, 706-07 (1997).
203 See Guat. Comm'n for Hist. Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence,
Recommendations § II(4)(c), available at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/
english/recs2.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
204 See Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report
and Assessment, 16 Hum. RTs. Q. 656, 663 (1994).
205 See Truth and Reconciliation Comm'n of S. Afr., Report 95 (2003).
206 See Alexander Segovia, The Reparation Proposals of the Truth Commission in
El Salvador and Haiti: a History of Noncompliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPA-
RATIONS 154, 156-60 (Pablo de Grief ed., 2006).
207 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 20.
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rials for the victims of the conflict . . . ."208 Indeed, it is perhaps the
commission that has given most attention to the issue. Appendix 4 of the
report insists on the "significance of remembering the past" and describes
memorials as "unique and versatile mechanism(s) for remembrance" which,
in the context of transitional justice, "serve as prisms through which to see
past, present and future." 209 The Commission made presentations on that
matter to various international and domestic constituencies and found that
"there is great interest in the creation of memorials in Sierra Leone both on
an individual and on an organized and national level . . . ."210 Although
sometimes falling short of the actual building of new monuments, Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission efforts have led to the renam-
ing of several sites. Notably, Freetown's Congo Cross Bridge has been
renamed the "Peace Bridge." 2 1 1 A National War Memorial Committee was
also established in 2002.212
Outside institutionalized commissions, it is notable that several
projects of "sites of conscience" originating from victims themselves have
been supported through international funding. For example, the Interna-
tional Coalition of Sites of Conscience has created a Project Support Fund
that provides both financial and technical support to the building of such
sites. 213 As such, it has been active in Sierra Leone, for example, where it
has supported the activities of the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG),
a local NGO involved in transitional issues and intent on following up on
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendations on symbolic
reparations. 214 The role of the CGG has typically been to bring various civil
society actors together to discuss transitional strategies, notably in the town
208 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: RE-
PORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, VOLUME ONE
(2004) 239, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html (follow
"Volume I" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
209 Appendix 4, supra note 142, para. 3.
210 Id. para. 20.
211 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: RE-
PORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, VOLUME
THREE B (2004) 476, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.
html (follow "Volume 3B" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
212 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 19.
213 See Int'l Coalition of Sites of Conscience, New Sites of Conscience Programs,
http://www.sitesofconscience.org/activities/new-programs/en/ (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
214 See id.
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of Gbendembu, the site of a mass grave. 2 15 A similar initiative has been
launched in Liberia and operates parallel to the official Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission.216 There is, therefore, a clear practice of sponsoring sites
of conscience even outside judicial processes, but with a particular view to
ensuring victim participation and providing a more general form of
rehabilitation.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR MONUMENTS IN THE ICC/TFV CONTEXTS
In the previous section, I have sought to show how monument
building has had a significant role in victim-oriented initiatives, even as it
draws on the register of transitional justice. The contexts in which monu-
ment building takes place are, of course, different than those in which inter-
national criminal tribunals operate. It is critical to ask whether the
experiences of monument building can be transferred to the ICC context
and, if so, whether they should be. In this section, I seek to make the argu-
ment not only that encouraging the building of commemorative sites is a
significant contribution that the Rome institutions can make, but also that it
could uniquely alleviate some of the concerns that I have identified as
emerging from the current reparation/assistance regime.
A. The Quantitative Problem
Given what will probably be fairly limited resources, both in the
absolute and relative to some of the harm suffered, monuments seem to
make good use of scarce reparatory and assistance resources. Monuments
need not be expensive at all, and their reparatory and rehabilitative potential
is strong if they reestablish some of the victims' dignity, facilitate transi-
tional justice, allow commemoration, help build a historical record and pre-
vent future atrocities.
The construction of monuments as reparation or assistance mea-
sures limits the risk that some victims' plight will be more highlighted than
others. Even if a monument is constructed as a result of a particular repara-
tion order issued following a particular guilty verdict, its impact will likely,
or can be made to, have an impact beyond the particular victims of the
accused. Monuments create a positive externality for as many victims and
their kin as they commemorate successfully. Moreover, to the extent that
commemorative monuments are built at the TFV's autonomous initiative as
a form of assistance, monuments can even more clearly be a way to bridge
215 See id.
216 See id.
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the gap between participating and non-participating victims in court, by en-
suring that all benefit from the process and result.
The building of commemorative monuments essentially creates a
positive externality from which all victims can benefit. This may include
victims of individuals who were prosecuted but who, for some reason, did
not, or could not, participate in proceedings, or could not prove their quality
as victims. It may include victims of individuals who were not prosecuted
either because they could not be found, or because domestic courts proved
"able and willing" to judge them. Victims of crimes analogous to the ones
for which a conviction was obtained will nonetheless benefit from the com-
memoration of analogous massacres, which will have been shown to be part
of a pattern. In the end, reparation and assistance to some may end up repre-
senting reparation and assistance to all.
Finally, the building of commemorative monuments is a device that
is sufficiently ambitious to do justice to some of the harm suffered, but not
so broad as to create misplaced expectations that the international commu-
nity can fully compensate all of the suffering caused. Monuments afford a
definite visibility for the efforts of the ICC and TFV, where sprinkling of
very small amounts of reparations to many claimants might engender frus-
tration. By associating international criminal justice more closely with tran-
sitional justice efforts, by "symbolizing" harm rather than seeking to
account for it numerically, "monuments" provide a clear sense of the sort of
aid that the ICC can realistically provide, assistance which is characterized
by how it can help victims rebuild their lives concretely. Such efforts pro-
vide a result that is tangible and can maximize transparency.
B. The Qualitative Problem
ICC and TFV contributions to the construction of memorializing
monuments would clearly help nudge reparations and assistance beyond the
monetary or material and the strictly rehabilitative, towards something
broader, in the order of "satisfaction," as understood by international human
rights bodies. Monuments "make sense" of suffering not by reducing it to
its economic loss and welfare rehabilitative dimensions. Instead, they har-
ness reparations and assistance to the more complex goal of healing socie-
ties through the solemn recognition of suffering. They give a meaning to the
suffering of victims and transform it into a positive contribution to society
rather than simply try to compensate for it. The process also ensures that
victims are treated with dignity. Victims are treated as citizens concerned
with their society and the avoidance of a repeat of the crimes from which
they suffered, rather than individual interest maximizers seeking only to
improve their personal situation.
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As has been seen, it is only partly problematic that the ICC legal
regime does not incorporate satisfaction as a possible form of reparation. At
least when it comes to the TFV's "assistance" activities, there is no real
limitation to the sort of project that money can be provided for, as long as it
is for the benefit of victims. The issue is more complicated if one is talking
of reparations stricto sensu, but I have argued that the ICC regime does not
so much exclude as fail to mention symbolic reparations, and the Court
seems open to interpret its mandate broadly. 217 At any rate, monuments are
a singular sort of symbolic reparation; they have symbolic effects but
clearly have a substantial material and financial component to them, so that
they could easily be simply one of the ways in which reparation money is
spent. In that sense, the TFV, as "implementer" of the Court's reparation
orders, will also act essentially as a "demonetizing" device, one that will
transform, for example, reparation paid by the convicted into services and
assistance. "Rehabilitation" as a form of reparation, moreover, is quite a
broad term and could be understood to incorporate reparation that is largely
symbolic in nature, rather than simply the more traditional rehabilitative
focus on health.2 18
Further, commemorative monuments are particularly suited to en-
couraging participation. Contra some NGOs' suggestion that "[e]ngaging in
community reconciliation activities can in many ways destroy the individ-
ual agency of victims to determine how they wish to respond to their vic-
timisation . . . ,"219 the record of actually building commemorative sites, as
described earlier in this article,2 20 suggests that such sites are formidable
vehicles of participation so long as they are conceived properly. The ICC
and TFV could ensure that monuments are conceived in ways that maxi-
mize their potential as collective processes of reckoning. As has been seen,
this is something that the IACHR has encouraged, and there is no reason to
think that, at least under the TFV's mandate, something similar could not be
done with the Court. The TFV has a monitoring role on how reparations or
assistance funds are spent, and that monitoring role might extend to outlin-
ing or at least influencing the broad conditions under which the design of
217 See Draft ICC Strategy, supra note 62.
218 See WEMMERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 35 (noting that "[elven though satisfac-
tion is not part of the formal definition of reparation adopted by the Assembly of
State Parties, many of its elements, such as an apology, public acknowledgement
and commemorations, can have a rehabilitative effect on victims."). See also, ICC
Rules, supra note 2, Rule 94(1)(f) (Victim's requests for reparations shall include
"[c]laims for rehabilitation and other forms of remedy . . . .").
219 Comments on Global Strategic Plan, supra note 8, at 3.
220 See infra § III.
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commemorative sites is to be decided. Intelligently-designed reparations,
such as those crafted by the IACHR, can indicate the broad direction to be
taken whilst leaving the details to be worked out by the state, the victims
and possibly even some of the perpetrators themselves. 221
C. The Scope Problem
Monuments also seem an ideal way of collectivizing reparations in
a way that transcends some of the ratione personae limitations associated
with them. In the context of the Rome institutions, it is quite clear that any
monument ordered as a form of reparation or built with TFV funds would
have a beneficial impact, not only on the particular victims of the accused,
but on all victims. Indeed, the monument might not even particularly distin-
guish between classes of victims. Such a monument can be a way of sug-
gesting that the ICC regime is less about attending to the plight of a
multitude of isolated individuals than it is about engaging in a broader reha-
bilitative effort towards society, the body politic and communities. To the
extent the ICC legal framework specifically anticipates the possibility of
collective reparations and/or collective TFV assistance, its broad focus mili-
tates in favor of the construction of monuments a typical form of aid.
"Monuments" can strongly signal the extent to which the crimes were com-
mitted both against individuals and a collectivity, such as an ethnic group, a
civilian population, or a side in a conflict. One can see how monuments
might become the object of processes of collective appropriation, as they
end up being understood and interpreted in complex ways by society.
Monuments can also create temporal "bridges" between the past
and the future in ways that deal effectively with some of the temporal binds
of both reparation and assistance. Their very architecture can be thought of
as a way both to emphasize the harm suffered in the past and be an aspira-
tion to the future, even as they serve as focal points for reconciliation and
truth telling in the present. In other words, commemorative sites combine
the best aspects of backward-looking reparations and future-oriented "assis-
tance." In that respect, monuments also seem particularly suited to creating
a long-term legacy of international criminal justice. They are clearly here to
stay, and the experience of "sites of conscience" is that many have had a
very significant duration. In the long term, monuments can serve as sym-
bolic reminders of the past, and as symbols of a certain continuity. Beyond
that, they can stand as bulwarks against the risk of repetition.
221 See Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 24. As has been pointed out in the Sierra
Leone context, especially given the level of illiteracy, "public work around which
to gather and discuss would serve as an excellent vehicle of sensitization." Id.
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D. The Contextual Problem
The building of monuments can be seen as a way of de-individual-
izing, or collectivizing, not only the victims' suffering, but also the guilt of
the perpetrator or perpetrators. Monuments have the potential for partly
smoothing out international criminal justice's bias in favor of the guilty
individual. The examples that I have highlighted of monument construction
being ordered primarily dealt with crimes committed by the state and signif-
icant numbers of its agents. It is because of the structural and organizational
nature of the crimes at stake that it made sense to order reparations, such as
monuments, which highlighted the collectively-committed nature of the
crimes. Indeed, it would almost not make sense to have monuments evoking
the victims of a single individual. In many cases, even if such an individual
were the head of state, the crimes would have been committed by a multi-
tude. If monuments are erected as part of ICC- or TFV- related efforts, their
design will inevitably reflect the wrongdoing of a collectivity of partici-
pants in atrocities. Therefore, even in cases where individual crimes trigger
specific reparation orders, monuments should be conceived, and come to be
seen, as broader reparation for a variety of crimes. They can also better
transcend the divisions between guilt and different types of responsibility
and causes, so that a monument ordered or built with the encouragement of
the ICC or TFV could be evidence, not only of individual evil, but also of
state failure or the international community's omissions. 2 22
Moreover, a victims' reparations or assistance policy that focuses
on how it can contribute to transitional justice is one that will distinguish
itself from parallel transitional, reconstruction and development policies. At
a certain level, monuments can be part of the process of transcending the
divide between judicially-determined reparations and international assis-
tance in a way that could be highly specific and recognizable. "Monu-
ments" can help fuse the registers of international criminal justice and
transitional justice with that of victim rehabilitation. Indeed, the TFV has
suggested that one of the key "cross-cutting issues" in its program overview
is "promoting community reconciliation, acceptance; and rebuilding com-
munity safety nets." 2 23 At the very least, victims must be victims of crimes
falling within the Court's jurisdiction, which are, in all likelihood, crimes
over which the Prosecutor has launched an investigation. Commemorative
222 For example, the international community's own role in allowing certain crimes
to happen might be recognized through monuments, even as it tends to be eclipsed
by international criminal trials.
223 Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the
Activities and Projects of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims for
the Period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, 12, ICC-ASP/7/13 (Sept. 3 2008).
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initiatives, in this context, are sufficiently tied to the work of the ICC that
even the TFV's autonomous policies will be seen as more generally flowing
from Rome Statute state parties' overall commitment to accountability for
international crimes. As such, TFV commemorative initiatives encouraged
by the TFV will be in a better position to distinguish themselves from the
general work of reconstruction and development that invariably goes on in
transitional contexts.
CONCLUSION
The Statute, Rules and various other sources do not particularly an-
ticipate symbolic reparations, satisfaction, or, indeed, anything as specific
as the Court ensuring that reparations are used for the construction of com-
memorative monuments. However, this article has argued that it does seem
as if such reparations could be read into the Statute and, more importantly,
that encouraging "sites of conscience" through the TFV's implementation
efforts is just the sort of focused, well thought-out victims reparations pol-
icy that could maximize the ICC's impact. When it comes to the autono-
mous assistance powers of the TFV, the TFV regulations are formulated
broadly and, even though they do not per se particularly evidence a shift
towards the symbolic and transitional, there are already some signs that this
may change. Indeed, the TFV, rather than the Court, and the TFV as an
autonomous source of reparations and assistance, rather than the TFV as
mere implementer of the Court's reparations awards, should be the center-
piece of such a policy. I foresee that this is a division of labor that the Court
may be quite happy to live with, especially given the constraints on its time
and the relative superiority of an "administrative" program over one of judi-
cially-determined reparations. 2 24
At any rate, whether funds are channeled towards commemorative
initiatives either as reparations ordered by the Court but filtered by the
TFV, or as assistance given directly by the TFV, will in all likelihood make
very little difference to victims. One might argue, in fact, that the encour-
agement of commemorative sites is really where the distinction between
224 Indeed, the TFV has already made some steps in this direction by providing
funds for projects with a healing and reconciliation component. See TFV, TFV/
DRC/2007/R1/019, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/projects/tfvdrc2007rl019
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010); TFV, TFVIUG/2007/R2/039 & TFV/UG/2007/R2/041,
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/projects/tfvug2007r2O39-tfvug 2007r 2O4 1 (last
visited Apr. 26, 2010). These did not involve any strong commemorative element
and are part of early processes of assistance, but once verdicts have been pro-
nounced, some of the TFV's reconciliation work may take a much more "repara-
tive" connotation, and engage fully with issues of long-term transition.
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reparations and assistance becomes moot, especially in a context where the
challenge is less to devise whether one has a strong entitlement to either
than it is to make the most of very limited funds. We may, in fact, already
be moving away from a pure reparatory framework to one where victims of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court will primarily hear about the
Fund (largely because the Fund will provide much quicker relief, due to it
being much better funded), and one which will enable victims to avoid the
stress of participation at the trial.
Becoming involved in memorialization is one of the ways in which
the ICC could "reach for the impossible" by "simultaneously satisfy[ing]
individual and socio-political needs." 225 It could also go a long way to
bridge the gap between the "retributory theatre" 226 and the very real and
grim world that victims of atrocities have to live with. Compared to mone-
tary awards or general rehabilitation efforts, which are relatively blunt in-
struments of transitional justice, monuments can offer much more nuanced,
detailed and complex narratives of what happened, as well as why and how.
Memorials "lie at the intersection of the historical, political and aesthetic
axes." 227 In many ways, the architecture and art of commemoration are
richer languages to convey the totality of a traumatic experience than any
other tool. 2 2 8 For the purposes of transitional justice, it is arguably these
more totalizing narratives, even if they remain imperfect and contentious,
that are most necessary. Monuments also offer the potential for "translat-
ing" a judgment into something broader and more immediately and cultur-
ally cognizable by victims and society. Properly conceived, they can be
richer with symbolic and, therefore, transition-relevant material than many
judgments. This is increasingly relevant as the TFV seems bent on being a
"participatory" body that encourages civil society to come up with projects
to help victims.
There is a broader lesson in all of this, one that has to do with how
some key concepts of international criminal justice are understood. I argue
for a much stronger intertwining of the themes of international criminal
justice and transitional justice, reparations, assistance and memorialization.
225 HAMBER, supra note 93, at 582.
226 See generally E.M. Morgan, Retributory Theater, 3 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. I
(1988).
227 Appendix 4, supra note 101, para. 4.
228 See I/A Court H.R., Concurring opinion of Judge A.A. Cangado Trindade, Mi-
guel Castro-Castro Prison case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2006, Series C., No. 160, 1
20 (writing that the "mystery of artistic creation" offers the "indescribable mo-
ment" in which "the worldly limitation of the perishable ends in us humans and the
perennial starts." (quoting Stefan Zweig)).
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This calls for a different theory of these distinct themes and their relation to
each other; international criminal justice must see itself not only as law and
prosecution based, but also results oriented and dynamically geared towards
affecting the transitional future. Reparations, furthermore, need to increas-
ingly emphasize collective and symbolic dimensions that give a more holis-
tic meaning to the suffering of victims. As Jean-Baptiste Jeangbne Vilmer
put it, "le r6gime de rdparation de la CPI . . . reste encore trop dans une
logique r6tributiviste . . . it faudrait plut6t aborder (le probl6me) dans une
logique cons6quentialiste, qui 6value moralement l'action (de la Cour) en
fonction de ses cons6quences." 22 9 Transitional justice can be the glue that
links these different ideas together in complex and novel ways.
If the ICC/TFV regime were to pursue the sort of lead I indicate, it
would move even further away from traditional judicial logic. In other
words, it would be part of a broader trend where the "right to reparation,"
instead of being "exercised as part of the outcome to some form of legal
proceedings," is increasingly "divorced" from such proceedings and "inte-
grated into wider social, political, and judicial reform processes, which to-
gether are intended to contribute to what is commonly termed 'social
reconstruction' or 'reconciliation.' "230 At the same time, it would retain a
unique specificity compared to broad transitional programs, which deal
with more than atrocities, in that it would remain tied specifically, if not to
the establishment of individual guilt, at least to the commission of interna-
tional crimes and the specific, if diffuse, entitlement that flows from having
suffered from them. The ICC/TFV regime would thus emerge as a compre-
hensive, at least partly internationally-triggered and -monitored program to
deal with the consequences of international crimes in transitional contexts.
It would complement broader transitional efforts rather than act as a substi-
tute to them.
Several criticisms can no doubt be made of the option that this arti-
cle has suggested. A first critique is that "monuments as reparations" or
"monuments as assistance" might end up allowing the international commu-
nity to dictate to a country how it should go about its transition in a context
where the ICC, in particular, may already be perceived as having arrogated
229 ". . . the ICC's reparations regime ... remains stuck in retributivist logic . . . it
would be better to approach the problem from a consequentialist logic, which mor-
ally evaluates the action (of the Court) according to its consequences." JEAN-BAP-
TISTE JEANGENE VILMER, RtPARER L'IRREPARABLE: LES RtPARATIONS AUX
VICTIMES DEVANT LA COUR PlNALE INTERNATIONALE 176 (2009).
230 M. Briton Lykes & Marcie Mersky, Reparations and Mental Health: Psycho-
logical Interventions Towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading Social
Realities, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 589, 590 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
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itself a broad power over transitional justice outcomes. This is indeed a
danger, but not a significant one. The Court and TFV will be well inspired
to draw from the experience of the IACHR, which has consistently elected
to decide the principle of monument construction and sometimes has gone
as far as giving a few broad orientations, but has resisted the temptation of
taking on the role of the architect - something which would defeat the pur-
pose of having monuments as modes of popular and collective memory
appropriation. At any rate, there is a big difference between the IACHR and
the ICC/TFV regime. While the former can order states to build monu-
ments, the latter will only be able to fund initiatives, private but also maybe
public, that have the same effect. The TFV, in this context, will be particu-
larly suited to determine whether there is a real local demand for help in
commemorating certain events, and should act as an enabler rather than as a
provider.
A second, more complicated argument against this sort of symbolic
contribution to victims challenges the reasons for going through the Rome
Statute institutions in the first place. After all, it is not as if the international
community, the state involved, or private interests could not finance such
initiatives on entirely different budgets, decoupling the issue of memory
entirely from the ICC and TFV. This may, of course, happen, and is not a
bad thing in itself, except that there is a strong, principled point in favor of
drawing a connection between the international community's principal tool
of intemational criminal justice and memorialization. The idea is that the
edification of commemorative sites is not alien to the process of interna-
tional judicial accountability and attention to victim needs, but is, in fact, an
inherent part of it. There may also be a concern that broader transitional
justice initiatives should not "piggyback" on scarce funds devoted specifi-
cally to victims. It is true that monuments have a positive impact that tran-
scends immediate victims of crimes. However, aside from the fact that
victims have often been conceived of having been and, in fact, have been,
the prime beneficiaries of the construction of "sites of conscience," the fact
that such sites act as positive social externalities in addition to benefitting
particular victims surely is not an argument against them. This is especially
the case when one considers that reconstructing a society fully informed by
the crimes of the past and thus ready to give victims their rightful place in
collective memory is, in a sense, one of the greatest services one can render
to victims.
A third and final argument relates to the intrinsic limitations of
monuments as "lieux de m6moire" and transitional justice tools. It has been
argued, for instance, that monuments are "not universally agreed to be ef-
fective representations of memory" any more than judgments or truth com-
mission reports, and that monuments represent "specific (and therefore
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limited and possibly fallacious) interpretations of the past." 2 3 1 Monuments
can also be criticized as simplifications and as glossing over the conflict-
orientated character of transitions, or as being culturally unsuited, 232 not to
mention too expensive. 233 Moreover, as Pierre Nora famously stated, it is
because there are no longer "milieux de m6moire" that we need "lieux de
m6moire;" i.e., it is because societies no longer routinely remember that
their memory needs to be incarnated in stone. 23 4 There is a danger that,
having detached themselves from memory, having externalized memory
into "things," populations will feel that they are no longer bound to engage
in any memory work. 23 5
These points are well taken but not conclusive. Monuments are ob-
viously not a panacea and it is important not to claim too much in their
name. Monuments are not, and should not, be presented as the whole story
of an atrocious episode, and should be open to many interpretations before,
during and after their construction. 2 36 They should, in other words, "avoid
over-determining or imposing closure .... ."237 However, as has been noted,
monuments are most often not a denial of the conflictive nature of memory,
but an opportunity for that conflict to express itself.238 As to "lieux de
231 Mia Swart, Name Change as Symbolic Reparation after Transition: the Exam-
ples of Germany and South Africa, 9 German L. J. 105, 112 (2008).
232 See Chris Cunneen, Exploring the Relationship Between Reparations, the Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE 355 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft ed., 2006).
233 The issue arose, for example, in Morocco, where a proposal was made for a
$600,000 statue in a poor community in the middle of the desert. See Sebastian
Brett, et al., Int'l Conf. Memorialization and Democracy: State Policy and Civic
Action, Santiago, Chile, June 20-22, Memorialization and Democracy: State Policy
and Civic Action, 17, available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/8/981.pdf.
234 Pierra Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mimoire, 26 REPRE-
SENTATIONs 7-24 (1989).
235 On the danger that memory will be "wholly absorbed by its meticulous recon-
struction" and that monuments manifest "the compulsion to remember and the
compulsion to forget," see SMELSER, supra note 106, at 53 ("[T]o memorialize is to
force a memory on us by the conspicuous and continuous physical presence of a
monument; at the same time a memorial also conveys the message that [now] that
we have paid our respect to a trauma, we are [now] justified in forgetting about
it.").
236 See JELIN, supra note 139, at 40.
237 Hite, supra note 109, at 24.
238 See JAMES E. YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY: HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS
AND MEANING 21 (1993) ("It may also be true that the surest engagement with
memory lies in its perpetual irresolution. In fact, the best memorial to the Fascist
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memoires" substituting for "milieux de m6moire," that is essentially a call
for constructing "lieux de m6moire" that challenge us to remember, and that
are works in progress rather than epilogues. 23 9 The important thing is not
that "monumentalization" has limitations, but that it has a place, and will
represent a sensible and, indeed, in some cases, superior, use of resources.
Ultimately, monuments, most notably shrines, memorials and mu-
seums, 2 40 are really a metaphor for something bigger that the ICC and the
Fund should be more interested in. Rather than deciding the issue of repara-
tions deductively on the basis of principles that make little sense until they
are applied to real world situations, reparation and assistance policy should
be shaped by the specific transitional needs of each society and attentive-
ness to how the international community can augment its beneficial impact.
This is something that the TFV has already understood and why, either as
an implementer of Court orders or in its own capacity, it constitutes the best
hope of both transforming Court-ordered reparations into symbolic ones
and launching into its own grassroots-oriented assistance. However, the
TFV will have to guard against the temptation of spreading itself too thin
and acting as too general a distributor of rehabilitation in a context where
victims primarily need societal changes that protect them against further
victimization.
None of this will occur without substantially more theorizing about
what is going on in terms of the ICC when it comes to victims. This will, in
due course, call for further truly interdisciplinary scholarship on repara-
tions. In particular, I have in mind the unexplored connections between in-
temational criminal law, transitional justice, geography, cultural studies and
the "architecture of commemoration." At a certain level, the confluence of
responsibility, memory and art may lead to some of the most enduring real-
izations of international criminal justice.
era and its victims may not be a single memorial at all - but simply the never-to-be-
resolved debate over which kind of memory to preserve, how to do it, in whose
name, and to what end.").
239 See JELIN, supra note 94, at 151 (discussing the need to "search for ways in
which to incorporate in the design of territorial markers a level of ambiguity that
invites active engagement of the public, offering an opportunity for expression of a
variety of sensibilities and for an active labor of memory . . . .").
240 Although I have highlighted the monumental in this article as particularly em-
blematic of what I have in mind, "lieux de m6moire," strictly, can include anniver-
saries, naming of streets, ceremonies, conservation of archives, etc.
